The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: CO2 Cap and Trade in New Hampshire by Edwards, Andrew Joseph
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) Interactive Qualifying Projects
August 2009
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: CO2 Cap
and Trade in New Hampshire
Andrew Joseph Edwards
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Interactive Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Edwards, A. J. (2009). The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: CO2 Cap and Trade in New Hampshire. Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all/876
  
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
CO
2
 Cap and Trade in New Hampshire 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Andrew J. Edwards 
August 26, 2009 
Professor Kent J. Rissmiller 
 
 
 
 
INTERACTIVE QUALIFYING PROJECT REPORT 
 
Submitted to the faculty of Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
in partial fulfillment of the Degree of Bachelor of Science 
 
In cooperation with the Science, Technology & Energy Committee 
of the New Hampshire House of Representatives  
1 
 
Abstract 
 
Our greatest challenge in confronting climate change will be the transition away from fossil fuel 
combustion as our primary source of electricity.  The market-based policy of cap and trade is a 
preferable solution to this problem that forces electric generators to compete for the right to emit 
CO2 while minimizing damage to the economy.  This policy is studied from the perspective of a 
state legislator deciding whether to adopt it, and evaluated in the context of a proposed federal 
policy. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Anthropogenic climate change will alter the course of human development in the next few 
decades.  Preventing climate change requires that we undergo a cultural and technological 
revolution, and that continued prosperity be no longer dependent on fossil fuel combustion.  The 
market-based approach of cap and trade promises concrete emissions reductions at the lowest 
cost possible, using economic incentives to change both consumer and producer behavior.  With 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, New Hampshire is using this policy to target the greatest 
source of CO2 emissions: the electric industry. 
Background 
New Hampshire‘s electric industry is dominated by Public Service of New Hampshire, which 
serves 70% of all utility customers.  Deregulation of the industry in the 1990‘s forced regulated 
utilities to divest of generation facilities and instead purchase electricity from merchant 
generators on the regional market. PSNH was excluded from this and still generates about half of 
the electricity it supplies — 85% of which comes from coal.  The deregulated market provided 
new natural gas facilities to supply future electric demand, which is growing almost twice as fast 
as the state‘s population.  Though natural gas generates 2–3 times less CO2, state customers will 
remain dependent on coal as long as it produces the cheapest electricity. 
New Hampshire led government efforts to reduce CO2 emissions by adopting one of the most 
comprehensive clean power strategies in the nation.  It formulated an agreement with 
neighboring states in 2001 to increase efficiency in electric consumption, decrease CO2-
dependence in electric production, and create a regional emissions trading program.  It enacted 
the first mandatory CO2 cap in the U.S. in 2002, forcing PSNH to reduce its emissions to 1990 
levels by 2006.  New Hampshire has since created widely-successful energy efficiency programs 
for utility customers, and a requirement for utilities to get an increasing share of their electricity 
from renewable generation. 
Cap and trade is the logical next step for reducing power plant emissions in the long-term.  
Environmentalists prefer it to a carbon tax because it sets a binding emissions cap over the entire 
industry.  Politicians prefer it to a carbon tax because it uses tradable CO2 permits to establish a 
price for emissions rather than having the government set one directly.  It is also more politically 
viable because it regulates electricity producers, but not consumers. The policy achieved an 
efficient reduction of SO2 and NOx emissions during the 1990‘s, and government regulators 
believe it will have similar success with CO2. 
Methods 
The project was conducted primarily in the role of participant-observer, followed by more 
traditional methods of research and analysis.  It took on an added dimension of civic 
responsibility through actual participation in legislating the proposed cap and trade program.  It 
also substituted policy recommendation with policymaking, which could have sacrificed 
academic objectivity for political efficacy.  The legislative role was maximized for data 
collection to negate such an effect.  This first-hand experience then supplemented secondary 
research methods of literature review and modeling for the purpose of interpreting and 
evaluating the legislative result. 
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Results 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative became the first CO2 cap and trade system in the U.S.  It 
began as a 2003 agreement between governors from the states of CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, 
NJ, NY, RI and VT.  It then took on the form of a Staff Working Group consisting of 
government regulators and experts who worked for two years to collect data, analyze state 
policies, and develop a model cap and trade policy.  That policy framework was then formalized 
by the governors in a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding and a 2006 Model Rule.  This gave 
New Hampshire until 2009 to implement a cap and trade program that does the following: 
 Cap electric industry emissions at 8.6 million tons per year 
 Reduce cap by 10% from 2015 to 2018 
 Mandate cap compliance from fossil fuel plants 25 MW and above 
 Issue tradable emission allowances for every ton of CO2 under the cap 
 Auction at least 25% of emissions allowances 
 Grant bonus allowances for early reductions made from 2006 to 2008 
 Accept CO2 offsets in lieu of allowances for up to 3.3% of compliance 
 Expand the use of offsets under Price Trigger Events 
The House Science, Technology & Energy committee drafted HB 1434 in 2008 with the intent of 
enacting the prescribed program.  It gathered overwhelming public support for the legislation in 
an initial hearing lasting two full days.  It solicited advice from government regulators, climate 
scientists, economists, environmental activists and businesses in legislative deliberation.  It 
increased the legislation‘s technical and political effectiveness through a two-week amending 
process.  The committee made the legislation a custom fit for New Hampshire, deciding the 
following details of the program left unspecified in the multistate agreement: 
 Regional auction to distribute allowances  
 100% of allowance revenue used for consumer energy efficiency programs 
 Consumer rebate for allowance costs exceeding a certain price threshold   
 12 million bonus allowances to PSNH for converting a 150 MW oil-fired unit to biomass 
The cap and trade program prevailed in the state legislature with supermajority support and was 
enacted in June 2008.  It received a positive recommendation from the Science, Technology & 
Energy committee in a 12-2 vote.  It passed the House of Representatives in a bipartisan vote of 
214-107.  It withstood challenges from industry lobbyists in the Senate Energy & Environment 
and Finance committees, with only minor changes to the price thresholds.  It passed the Senate in 
a bipartisan vote of 16-8 and was promptly signed by the Governor in a highly-publicized 
ceremony. 
The policymaking process succeeded due to strong direction from the executive branch.  It 
originated in the Governor‘s office, which had cultivated a supportive policy environment over 
the course of a decade.  It was appropriately overseen by regulatory officials who were centrally 
involved in planning the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.  These officials asserted a 
significant degree of influence in the legislative process to preserve the core of the program 
while helping it overcome political obstacles.  The process guaranteed a definite policy result by 
minimizing opportunities for disagreement or error. 
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Cap and trade affects a new energy-emissions dynamic in the state.  It effectively freezes fossil 
fuel generation at current levels, forcing future growth in electric production to come from 
renewable energy.  It creates a new long-term cost equation for power producers by turning CO2 
emissions into a scarce commodity that must now factor into financial planning.  It also starts to 
bend the electric demand curve by realizing economies of scale for existing energy efficiency 
programs.  These consumer-based programs supplement the cost of cap and trade to producers, 
allowing them greater flexibility in reducing emissions. 
New Hampshire‘s adoption of cap and trade also paves the way for a much-needed federal 
program.  It builds momentum behind U.S. support for an international cap and trade agreement 
that has been 12 years in the making.  It also builds confidence and support in an electric 
industry that is adverse to change due to its concern for long-term stability and economic 
certainty.  It presents a successful model for cap and trade that would function more effectively 
at the national level.  Congress is considering such a move under H.R. 2454, which would absorb 
the regional cap and trade system and implement a comprehensive strategy for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions similar to New Hampshire‘s. 
Conclusion 
There is broad consensus over the reality of climate change — what we need now is action.  Cap 
and trade is a timely approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions that is popular and easy to 
implement, making it a comfortable transition for the public.  The complicated problem of 
stopping global warming in the face of rising electric consumption might seem to demand an 
unprecedented level of government intervention.  By acting quickly to adopt cap and trade we 
can achieve a more efficient environmental outcome through the power of the market, generating 
a technological revolution and continued prosperity for generations to come. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 From December of 2007 to November of 2008, I had the pleasure of serving the city of 
Nashua as a state representative in the New Hampshire legislature.  During that time I worked on 
issues that were of personal importance to me, such as genocide and criminal justice, and issues 
that were of concern to my constituents and the state as a whole, such as civil rights and 
education.  These were issues I sought active involvement in, either by submitting legislation or 
speaking about them publicly.  However, the most important work I did as a legislator was to 
help decide the fate of a bill that had come before my committee.  I consider myself privileged to 
have been involved at all with this legislation because it did not just affect me, my family, or my 
constituents, but people everywhere on Earth. 
 Global warming is the single greatest threat to civilization that we currently face, or ever 
have faced, and House Bill 1434 was New Hampshire‘s attempt to stop it.  Though 
anthropogenic climate change is a relatively new problem, it promises to forever alter the course 
of human development in the course of a few decades.  Acknowledging the truth that greenhouse 
gas emissions are bringing about this change is not enough.  The consequences of ignoring it 
could be virtually unlimited, and would force us to adapt under the harshest of conditions.  To 
avert climate change is to respond to an invisible problem — carbon dioxide emissions — 
requiring sacrifices which we cannot immediately justify.  It will be a test of human nature, but 
something we are completely capable of accomplishing. 
 Our society has achieved a rapid pace of development with fossil fuel combustion at the 
center.  Judging by the growth in other technologies in just the past 100 years, our continued use 
of fossil fuels is not necessary but simply convenient.  It is inevitable that we outgrow this source 
of energy, for other reasons besides climate change, and we already have new alternatives to 
choose from.  The hardest part of switching away from a carbon-based economy is transforming 
the electric generation sector, which has been the most resistant to change over the years.  
Neither the government nor the market alone can accomplish this result at the speed or cost that 
we need, but working together, they can efficiently create a new energy economy and ensure 
continued prosperity. 
 Cap and trade has emerged as the favored mechanism of weaning us off cheap fossil fuel-
generated electricity.  It works to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to slow the rate of global 
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warming while also creating a market incentive for power generators to transition towards 
cleaner methods of producing electricity.  As a market-based policy, cap and trade is more 
acceptable to the public than direct government regulation.  This kind of program requires more 
work on the part of the government to implement and oversee, but it also allows the government 
to guarantee an absolute reduction in CO2 emissions at the lowest cost possible.  Most 
importantly, cap and trade is not foreign to power generators and has demonstrated success with 
previous applications in the electric industry. 
 While New Hampshire implements cap and trade with neighboring states in the 
Northeast, the country as a whole decides how it will address climate change.  The evolution of 
the policy contained in HB 1434 must be looked at in this broader context, as it provides a model 
that the federal government might choose to adopt.  Creating program this complex is no small 
feat politically, and in the current economic climate the public needs added assurance that it will 
not suffer further as a result of it.  If and when federal cap and trade becomes a reality it will 
supersede the state‘s program, but that should not be seen to minimize this initial effort.  Instead, 
the current direction of federal policy can be traced back to our experience, so this story of cap 
and trade in New Hampshire can give us a sense of how it will fare at the national level.  
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2 Background 
 
 In recent years the American public has come to recognize the reality of global warming 
– an effect of human development that threatens to drastically alter life on this planet.  The 
central role of carbon dioxide in both the acceleration of this phenomenon and our energy 
production presents a complex problem that public policy must address.  New Hampshire has 
assumed the lead in moving to reduce CO2 emissions at a time when the federal government was 
unable to provide policy direction.  The larger trend towards cap and trade programs as a way to 
reduce emissions without inhibiting economic growth led the state to consider being one of the 
first to institute such a program in the United States. 
 
2.1  NH Electric Power Industry 
 
Generation of electricity accounts for a major share of CO2 released into the atmosphere 
which has made the electric sector a prime target for emission reductions.  Power plants are the 
largest stationary sources of CO2 emissions and are heavily reliant on fossil fuels, coal in 
particular.  At the same time electric utilities provide a basic service that society has grown 
increasingly dependent upon.  As a result the industry is allowed to be more vertically integrated 
than most and subject to a greater degree of government regulation.  While it is possible to 
institute emissions controls more directly in such an environment the economic impact is equally 
direct, making it a politically sensitive issue. 
 
2.1.1  Electric Demand 
 
New Hampshire is the fastest growing state in New England and had an estimated 
population of over 1.3 million in 2006 (United States Census Bureau, 2007).  Residential electric 
consumption grew more than twice as fast as the population did between 1995 and 2006 (United 
States Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2007).  Consumption increased the greatest in 
the commercial sector while it decreased in the industrial sector due to the decline of 
manufacturing in the state.  The resulting share of electric consumption by sector was roughly 
40% residential, 40% commercial, and 20% industrial, consistent with the overall breakdown in 
New England.  During this period electric rates increased by an average of 1.6% each year.  
Although the price of electricity was highest for residential customers the greatest increase in 
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electric rates during this period was seen by commercial and industrial (C&I) customers.  Table 
2-1 summarizes the overall increases in state population, consumption and rates during this 
eleven-year period: 
 
Table 2-1:  Change in Population, Electric Consumption, Electric Rates from 1995 to 2006 
 
  
 
 
Source: ISO New England Inc. [ISO-NE], 2007 
New Hampshire has seen the highest growth in electric demand of all the states in New 
England.  Annual electric demand grew by 2% between 1995 and 2006 and was projected to 
continue growing at 1.6% each year between 2007 and 2016. Peak demand in the summer grew 
twice as fast during this period and reached an all-time high in August 2006.  It was projected to 
continue growing at 2.3% each year between 2007 and 2016.  The ratio of annual hourly demand 
to peak hourly demand has steadily declined in NH and the region and is projected to continue 
falling due to increasing summer temperatures and use of air conditioning.   
An increase in peak demand will require the installation of additional generating capacity 
in the region even if average demand remains relatively stable.  The Northeast Power 
Coordinating Council, responsible for ensuring the reliability of the regional electric grid, sets an 
Installed Capacity Requirement (ICR) in excess of projected peak demand.  There is currently 
33,199 MW of installed capacity in the region which is enough to meet the projected peak 
demand of 27,885 MW for 2008 (ISO-NE, 2007).  In order to meet the ICR based on the 2016 
projection there would need to be 3,550 MW of additional capacity installed. 
 
2.1.2  Electric Generation 
 
 There are four electric utilities distributing power in separate service territories of the 
state.  They are subject to regulation by the NH Public Utilities Commission (PUC.  The PUC 
approves rate schedules and rates of return for the companies based on their costs and revenues 
from providing service.  The largest utility is Public Service Company of New Hampshire 
(PSNH) which serves 70% of the state.  Unitil and the NH Electric Cooperative each serve 12% 
and Granite State Energy (owned by National Grid) serves 6%. 
 1995 2006 Percentage Change 
Population 1,157,561 1,35,828 13.6 
Electric Demand (megawatthours) 9,007,000 11,094,000 23.1 
Electric Rate (cents/kWh) 11.72 13.84 18.0 
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 The electric industry underwent restructuring between 1996 and 2003 after the NH 
legislature decided to separate electric transmission and distribution from electric generation 
contemporaneously with other states in the region.  The intent was to create a competitive market 
for electric generation while continuing to regulate power delivery.  The state made an exception 
to this policy by allowing Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH) to retain some of 
its own generation assets to meet customer demand.  The majority of electric demand in the state 
is supplied by merchant generators in NH and in the region.  This electricity is purchased on the 
regional market administered by ISO New England (ISO-NE). 
 Installed generating capacity in NH is more than enough to meet the electric demand of 
NH customers so the state is a net exporter of electricity.  In 2006 a total of 22 million MWh of 
electricity was produced which is twice the amount the state consumed that year.  Approximately 
4.5 million of this was generated by PSNH and sold directly back to customers.  The remaining 
17.5 million was generated mostly by merchant plants and sold on the regional market.  The 
Seabrook Station nuclear facility generated 9.4 million of this and rest was generated mostly by 
Granite Ridge, Newington Energy, and TransCanada (EIA, 2007). 
 A substantial portion of electric generation in NH comes from fossil fuels.  The three 
predominant fuels used are coal, oil, and natural gas.  As an abundant resource in the United 
States coal has historically been the predominant fuel source in electric generation.  Through 
2006 the use of coal in NH has increased slightly while the use of oil has decreased.  In that year 
the cost of generating electricity from coal was $2.56 per million Btu while the cost of using oil 
was more than three times that (EIA, 2007; see Appendix A).  While the increasing price of oil 
has caused a similar volatility in natural gas prices, this has not led to a significant decline in 
usage of natural gas in the state.  Natural gas-fired generation was introduced primarily to meet 
growing peak demand in 2001 and 2002, prior to the spike in fuel prices, and secondarily 
because natural gas produces lower emissions than coal and oil (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency [EPA], 1997).  Table 2 lists the five major coal, oil, and natural gas plants in 
the state by ownership, fuel type and capacity rating: 
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Table 2-2: Major Fossil Fuel-Fired Generation in New Hampshire 
Plant Owner Fuel 
Capacity 
(megawatts) 
Merrimack Station PSNH Coal 434 
Schiller Station PSNH Coal 119 
Newington Station PSNH Oil 406 
Granite Ridge Granite Ridge Energy LLC Natural Gas 720 
Newington Power Facility Newington Energy LLC Natural Gas 525 
Source: New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services [DES], 2001b 
 
Coal helps PSNH provide regular service to electric customers at low cost but is also the 
most carbon-intensive fuel source in the state.  In 2006 about 85% of PSNH‘s self-supplied 
electricity was generated by the two coal plants and it is estimated that they produced more than 
half of all sector-wide emissions in that year.  Meanwhile the two natural gas plants generated 
50% more electricity than the coal plants did and it is estimated that they produced one third of 
all sector-wide emissions.  Granite Ridge and Newington Energy sell their electricity on the 
regional market mostly during times of peak demand.  While the electricity from these gas 
turbine units is more expensive due to higher fuel costs their fast start-up time provides 
reliability to the system during demand spikes. 
The electric sector is now the largest source of emissions in NH.  Electric generators 
emitted 7.7 million tons of CO2 in 2005 which is 36% of emissions statewide (EPA 2007).  This 
contrasts with the Industrial and Transportation sectors in the state, which have reduced 
emissions in recent years.  Figure 1 compares the emissions data by sector from 1995, 2000, and 
2005: 
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Figure 2-1: Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion in New Hampshire (million tons CO2) 
 
2.2  State Policy Environment 
 
The state government has set public policy in the direction of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG).  In advance of a planned move to regulate CO2 emissions NH has enacted 
programs to track emissions, reduce electric demand, and stimulate alternative energy 
production.  Consistent political leadership has been responsible for much of the progress in the 
past decade and now with a recent increase in public interest it is anticipated that the policy will 
be implemented in full. 
 
2.2.1  Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
In July 1999 the state created a voluntary NH Greenhouse Gas Registry which led to the 
creation of similar programs in other states and discussions about creating such a program 
regionally between states.  The intent of the registry was to allow companies to inventory their 
CO2 emissions and register early emission reductions to establish a baseline for any future 
federal GHG reduction program to come at the federal level.  The idea came after observing in 
the Federal Acid Rain Program (SO2) how some companies that had not controlled their 
pollution prior to the start of the program began with an advantage over companies that had 
made early reductions (DES, 1998).  The creation of the registry also coincided with discussions 
about interstate GHG trading agreements. 
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Following the successful implementation of the SO2 program and a regional NOx trading 
program, Governor Jeanne Shaheen directed the New Hampshire Department of Environmental 
Services (DES) to develop a strategy for further reducing air pollutants.  The department then 
released the NH Clean Power Strategy (CPS) in January 2001, which issued reduction targets in 
excess of federal and regional SO2 and NOx requirements, as well a new goal of reducing 
mercury and CO2 emissions (DES, 2001).  Although Massachusetts and Connecticut had already 
made similar plans the CPS became the most comprehensive environmental policy in the country 
at the time.  The strategy called for a cap on CO2 emissions at 7% below 1990 levels, which 
would be reached through an allowance trading system.  The NHCPS applied only to electric 
generation facilities of at least 25 MW, and specifically targeted the three fossil fuel-fired plants 
owned by PSNH.  It exempted the two large natural gas facilities which were not yet online, 
stating that they would already be subject to more stringent environmental regulations than the 
grandfathered PSNH plants, also adding natural gas is ―inherently a much cleaner fuel.‖  In the 
NHCPS it is evident that DES made two presumptions in favoring natural gas which were not 
borne out: 1) PSNH would comply with restructuring by selling its coal and oil-fired plants to 
private investors, and 2) the new, cleaner natural gas facilities would then cut out much of this 
coal and oil-based generation in a deregulated market.  HB 284 was concurrently introduced in 
the 2001 session to implement the NHCPS but was retained in committee for further study. 
In August of that year the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian 
Premiers (NEG/ECP) set forth an aggressive approach to GHG reductions with its Climate 
Change Action Plan (CCAP).  The plan proposed that the states and provinces agree to 
coordinate their policies regionally in order to meet GHG emissions reduction goals.  The 
regional goals are listed below: 
 
Short-term Goal: Reduce regional GHG emissions to 1990 emissions by 2010. 
Mid-term Goal: Reduce regional GHG emissions by at least 10% below 1990 
emissions by 2020, and establish an iterative five-year process, commencing in 
2005, to adjust the goals if necessary and set future emissions reduction goals. 
Long-term Goal: Reduce regional GHG emissions sufficiently to eliminate any 
dangerous threat to the climate; current science suggests this will require reductions of 
75–85% below current levels (NEG/ECP, 2001). 
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More importantly the plan established nine Action Items for the participants to work on in order 
to meet these goals.  Action Items 5, 6, and 9 set individual goals that paralleled those in the 
NHCPS.  Item 5 called for a 20% reduction by 2025 in the level of CO2 emitted per MWh 
generated.  Item 6 called for a 20% increase by 2025 in the amount of electricity saved through 
conservation programs.  Item 9 called for the creation of regional emissions banking and trading 
standards so as to build experience in the region with trading mechanisms and to encourage early 
reductions.  Recommendations for creating such a system were to be presented to the states at the 
NEG/ECP conference following the plan‘s adoption. 
 It was around this time that the DES commissioner of twelve years, Robert Varney, left 
the department after being picked by President Bush to head the EPA‘s Northeast region.  A few 
months later a follow-up report was released by DES listing recommendations for meeting the 
new NEG/ECP goals (DES, 2001a).  While renewing calls for the legislature to implement the 
NHCPS in the upcoming 2002 session, the DES report did not contain any significant policy 
developments and was largely perfunctory. 
 It is assumed that during this time DES was more concerned with securing the passage of 
retained HB 284.  Officials from DES, PUC, and the Governor‘s office, along with legislators 
and representatives of the environmental community, were in negotiations with PSNH over the 
contents of the bill and successfully reached an agreement on November 2, 2001 (DES, 2001c).  
The agreed upon amendments were made to the bill in committee and it was then passed on the 
House floor in the beginning of the 2002 legislative session.  HB 284 was passed by the Senate 
later that spring and signed into law by Gov. Shaheen on May 9, 2002, upon which it became 
known as the Clean Power Act. 
 The program created by the Clean Power Act (CPA) contained all the main components 
described by the NHCPS, with only one substantial change.  DES was still responsible for 
implementing the integrated multi-pollutant strategy, which included administering the emissions 
allowances to be banked, traded, or used for annual compliance.  The CO2 emissions cap was not 
as aggressive as what DES had wanted.  Its proposal was to use 5,425,866 tons, PSNH‘s 
emissions from 1990, as a baseline and beginning in 2006 to enforce a cap 7% below that, which 
would be 5,046,055 tons.  The CPA cap instead begins at 1990 levels in 2006, with a future cap 
for 2010 and beyond to be decided by the legislature no later than 2005 (State of New Hampshire 
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Revised Statutes Annotated [NH RSA]. 125-O:3, 2002).  DES put a positive spin on this by 
pointing out that the CPA cap would bring the state in line with reduction goals from the 
NEG/ECP CCAP. 
 As a result of the agreement with PSNH, there were additional provisions included in the 
CPA.  A new section was created for an Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energy, and 
Conservation and Load Management Incentive (NH RSA 125-O:5, 2002).  It provided that 
conservation and load management programs would be promoted as part of the strategy, and that 
PSNH could use funds normally designated for electric customers leftover from the System 
Benefits Charge (discussed in the next section) on internal energy efficiency projects.
1
  The most 
important provision in this section grants PSNH extra emissions allowances equivalent to the 
cost of any voluntary investments it makes in energy efficiency, conservation and load 
management, or renewable energy projects.  Depending on market prices, this created the 
potential for PSNH to accumulate more emissions allowances than it could use.  These ―bonus‖ 
allowances would essentially finance projects that reduce emissions for PSNH, assuming that in 
the future they could be sold on emissions trading markets or even offset the purchase of new 
allowances through a cap and trade program. 
 
2.2.2  Reducing Energy Usage and Reliance on Fossil Fuels 
 
 In the past decade, the state also created new programs to reduce the demand for fossil 
fuel-fired electric generation as it developed a comprehensive approach to reducing CO2 
emissions.  Consumer-based energy-efficiency programs have seen major success.  The state 
joined a regional effort to increase the use of alternative energy by electric utilities.  There are 
also new incentives to increase renewable generation by electric customers. 
 The PUC oversees the CORE Energy Efficiency Programs which were created in 2002.  
There are eight individual programs available to residential customers and commericial and 
industrial (C&I) customers, operated by the electric utilities and funded through the Systems 
Benefits Charge (SBC) assessed on monthly electric bills.  The ENERGY STAR® Homes 
Program provides incentives for customers and builders to construct or renovate homes with 
                                                 
1
 Prior to the agreement PSNH had been pursuing additional SBC funds through a filing at the PUC. 
For more, see Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. DE 01-169 (September 20, 2001) 
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20% more efficiency than building energy codes.
2
  Rebate programs for ENERGY STAR® 
appliances and lighting purchased are also available to residential customers. The Home Energy 
Solutions Program subsidizes part of the cost of insulation, weatherization and other energy 
efficiency upgrades up to $4,000 for existing homes and the Low Income Home Energy 
Assistance Program (LIHEAP) subsidizes the entire cost of these upgrades to needier customers 
through a combination of state and federal funding.  C&I customers larger than 100 kW are 
eligible for rebates through the New Equipment and Construction Program and the Large C&I 
Retrofit Program, and smaller customers are eligible for a 50% rebate on lighting, heating, and 
refrigeration upgrades through the Small Business Energy Solution Program.  Greater energy 
savings have been realized through C&I programs overall, however the ENERGY STAR® 
Lighting program has also provided a comparable benefit per dollars spent.  In the first five years 
the CORE programs have served over 275,000 customers in the state and will result in a lifetime 
savings of 4.3 billion kWh or $608 million (New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission [PUC], 
2007). 
 The state legislature recently passed two pieces of legislation encouraging the increased 
use of small-scale renewable generation to offset the electric load for utilities.  HB 447 was 
enacted in 2007, doubling the limit on net-metering – renewable energy generated by customers 
and sold back into the electric grid – to 1% of statewide load.  The bill also increased the limit on 
applicable generation from 25 kW to 100 kW.  HB 1628, enacted in 2008, provides residents 
with up to $6,000 in rebates for the installation of distributed solar and wind energy systems 
through a Renewable Energy Generation Incentive Program.  The money for this program comes 
from the state‘s new Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and is distributed on a first-come, 
first-served basis.  
The RPS was created in 2007 with the passage of HB 873.  It established basic levels for 
different classes of renewable energy which must be reflected in each electric utility‘s portfolio.  
It was designed with the goal of achieving 25% renewable energy in the state by 2025, following 
a commitment signed by Gov. Lynch in 2006.  Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) are issued to 
utilities for the purchase of blocks of electricity from renewable sources and must be used to 
meet the standard each year, otherwise that utility must make Alternative Compliance Payments 
(ACP) to the state.  The program functions similar to Cap and Trade as the standard increases 
                                                 
2
 The current standard is the 2006 International Energy Conservation Code. 
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incrementally over time and the RECs can be traded between utilities and with other states in the 
region that have implemented an RPS. 
 
2.3  Cap and Trade 
  
 The government now faces the challenge of addressing the greenhouse gas problem 
directly.  In deciding the most effective way to achieve CO2 emissions reductions, it is important 
to consider the economics of carbon pollution.  Would it be better to regulate emissions by 
imposing a tax on them, or would a market-based mechanism work better?  There is already a 
precedent of cap and trade achieving these kinds of reductions using the power of the market.  If 
the state is to implement a cap and trade policy it is important to look how it has functioned in 
the past and what can be expected from it under similar and dissimilar conditions. 
  
2.3.1  Policy Options 
 
 Consensus has formed around the idea that CO2 emissions must be reduced through an 
incentives-based policy instead of placing strict controls on them through government regulation.  
An incentive requires that there be an observable cost for emitting CO2 into the atmosphere.  
Thus, there are two basic variables that will determine how it functions and how it will be 
implemented. 
 A carbon tax would make cost an independent variable.  Emissions continue to vary 
based on a host of factors but ultimately reduce over time given the economic pressure.  The 
government can adjust the tax to balance the immediate needs of the economy with the goal of 
slowing climate change.  This also provides economic certainty, encouraging many of the 
capital-intensive projects needed to reduce emissions.  The revenue generated from such a tax 
can be used to either directly fund reduction programs or offset the related costs to consumers.  
Implementing this policy requires assessing the consumption of fossil fuels, similar to the way 
gasoline is taxed. 
 Cap and trade does the reverse, making total emissions the independent variable.  This is 
done by quantizing CO2 emissions, creating a tradable allowance that can be bought and sold 
within an absolute cap.  The market for emissions allowances then provides much of the 
economic pressure to encourage reductions.  While this involves more economic uncertainty, it 
makes it advantageous for emitters to make reductions faster than other competitors in the 
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market.  Allowing emission allowances to be banked and traded makes them a financial 
instrument likely to appreciate as they become scarcer.  This occurs as the government lowers 
the cap to meet its emissions reduction goal over time.  An initial auction of allowances allows 
the government to fund programs to encourage reductions or provide a rebate for consumers to 
lessen the economic impact.  Implementation of this policy requires a regulatory body to monitor 
CO2 emissions and administer allowances. 
 The carbon tax has been widely favored by economists, liberal and conservative alike 
(Wall Street Journal, 2007).
3
  A number of studies done through public and private institutions 
have determined that the carbon tax is the most economically efficient method of reducing 
emissions.  They all cite clear market signals due to its simple and direct nature as reasons for 
this (Green, Hayward & Hassett, 2007; Metcalf, 2007; Shapiro, 2007).  Some of this support for 
the carbon tax comes in response to perceived weaknesses with cap and trade in Europe, 
particularly the lack of an auction and opportunities to game the system.  For similar reasons, 
many have described the weakness of a tax policy as its novelty and political inexpedience.  
 The public debate over the issue has ruled in favor of cap and trade over a carbon tax, 
although they are not exclusive.  Popular perception has largely been shaped by the inherent 
political branding of the two policies.  The general antipathy toward new taxes and apathy about 
market-based solutions plays a role in this.  Conservative support for the carbon tax confuses the 
issue further.  Progressive environmental organizations and politicians have therefore stuck to 
cap and trade as the policy with a successful chance of passage.  A cap and trade program does 
not preclude a carbon tax from also being used in the future and for the interim can imitate some 
of the effects of a tax. 
Certain controls can be designed into a cap and trade systems to protect against volatility 
and provide greater economic certainty (United States Congressional Budget Office, 2008).  
Placing upper and lower limits on allowance prices reduces hazardous costs to consumers while 
maintaining an active market.  Allowing alternative methods of compliance eases concerns of a 
price emergency.  Though the cap itself can also be periodically adjusted to reflect these kinds of 
concerns, time is still one variable that does not easily translate to this policy.  It is in fact 
because of this that cap and trade is – and has been – seen to guarantee absolute results.  
                                                 
3
  Prominent supporters range across the spectrum, with such notables as Paul Volcker, Alan Greenspan, Robert 
Reich, Lawrence Summers, Joseph Stiglitz, Edwards Snyder, Herman Daley, Jeffrey Sachs, and Gregory Mankiw.   
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2.3.2 Case Study of NOx Budget Program 
 
 It is instructive to explore an existing implementation of the cap and trade model in the 
United States.  The Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) was the first multistate effort to 
develop a cap and trade system for controlling air pollutants.  The OTC NOx Budget Program 
(NBP) achieved NOx emissions reductions through regional cooperation, while important 
decisions for its implementation were left to individual states.  There are certain technological, 
economic, and political conditions and variables which might explain the successful design and 
execution of the NBP.  Understanding the successes of this policy and policymaking process is 
essential because, as was seen in the case of the NBP, a regional cap and trade program will have 
necessary implications for future, expanded policy. 
The NBP resulted from the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, limiting the emission 
of air pollutants which contribute to acid rain.  In addition to a federally administered SO2 
permitting program, the legislation also established the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) for 
the purpose of reducing NOx emissions (Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990).  The commission 
brought together representatives from nine northeastern and mid-Atlantic states – Connecticut, 
Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Rhode Island – and the District of Columbia.  NH joined the other states in signing a 
Memorandum of Understanding in 1994, seeking to design a cap and trade system.  A model rule 
for such a system, developed by the OTC with technical assistance from the EPA, was finalized 
in 1996.  The NBP went into effect in 1999 upon implementation of the model rule by the states.  
The regional cap lasted through 2002 and was set at 219,000 tons of NOx annually.  NH agreed 
to a statewide cap of 14,589 tons (DES, 2003). 
 The program applied to sources in the electric utility industry of 15 MW or greater and 
comparably sized industrial sources.  The states decided individually how to allocate allowances 
among affected sources in their state.  The EPA enforced compliance and oversaw most of the 
accounting for the program, including tracking of allowances.  The program included allowance 
banking but also featured a ―flow control‖ mechanism, causing unused allowances to depreciate 
in successive years.  There was no revenue associated with the program as it did not provide for 
an allowance auction.  The market for allowances was active despite this and bolstered 
reductions, yielding 25% in just the first year the program was operational (Farrell, 2000). 
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 Overall the NBP reduced NOx emissions by 60% below 1990 levels.  The related cost 
increase for wholesale electricity prices was less than half a percent, having a negligible impact 
on growth.  This did not result in an increased demand for imported electricity from outside the 
OTC region (referred to as ―leakage‖), despite the prevalence of restructuring in electric 
generation.  Instead generation in the region continued to grow during this period, with the ratio 
of emissions to power generated decreasing significantly.  This demonstrates cap and trade‘s 
capability to achieve emissions reductions without impeding development (Auslisi, Pershing, 
Farrell & VanDeveer, 2005). 
It is important to note that the issue of controlling NOx emissions is significantly different 
from CO2 in two ways.  Increased concentration of nitric acid in the atmosphere, contributing to 
acid rain, is a relatively localized problem compared to global warming.  Acid rain also poses an 
immediate danger to public health, unlike the gradual effects of climate change, and makes a 
compelling case for regulatory prerogative.  Despite these differences, a useful analogy can still 
be made.  ―Upwind‖ industrial centers in the Mid-West and Ohio River Valley were responsible 
for most of the acid rain that occurred ―downwind‖ in the Northeastern states.  Because the 
effects of NOx emissions were removed from the source, similar obstacles to regulation that 
existed then have been seen recently with respect to CO2 emissions.  The real success of the NBP 
was not just in producing emissions reductions between 1999 and 2002, but also in convincing a 
large swath of the country west of the OTC region to control NOx emissions after that (Auslisi et 
al., 2005). 
The particular success this cap and trade program depended on broad participation and 
agreement to an effective regulating scheme.  Though the OTC tested a fairly unorthodox model 
for environmental policymaking, the policy output of this multilateral process was similar to that 
of other cap and trade programs.  With a few exceptions, engagement in the stakeholder process 
and the competitive nature of the program itself provided the impetus needed for affected sources 
in the participating states to assent to the new regulations (McLean, 2005).  This came with the 
realization that companies would benefit more if their competitors were held to the same 
standard.  Viewed in the proper context then, this inclusive mechanism was needed to solve the 
real problem: getting ―upwind‖ polluters outside the OTC region to agree to NOx emission 
controls. 
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This was accomplished when the regional NBP developed into federal cap and trade 
system administered by the EPA.  The NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call began in 2003 
by assimilating the successful NBP and came to include 22 states by 2007.  This renewed the 
emissions cap and extended it westward to states that contributed significantly to NOx levels in 
downwind states.   It also included rules to allow for the conversion of banked NBP allowances 
during the first two years of the new trading program.  As of 2006 the EPA claimed emissions 
reductions of 60% below 2000 levels in states governed by the NOx SIP Call (Napolitano, 
Stevens, Schreifels & Culligan, 2007). 
The example that the NBP set as a successful implementation of the cap and trade model 
was critical for achieving that broader participation.  Its performance over the four years it was in 
operation had a substantial influence on confidence in the NOx SIP Call, leaving the OTC states 
in a strong position as this later program commenced.  Valuable lessons can be drawn from this 
experience about how to achieve a functioning trading market and, more importantly, substantial 
reductions in power plant emissions.  Looking to the future of CO2 cap and trade, it is especially 
important to consider how the economic efficiency realized in the NBP was dependent on the 
availability of control technologies. 
Front-end retrofits allowed power generators to make early reductions in the 1990‘s at 
relatively low cost.  While NOx is a byproduct of fossil fuel combustion, it can be minimized by 
lowering the combustion temperature and improving thermal efficiency.  Two-stage combustion 
using overfire air allows for NOx reductions between 50-70% in boilers and furnaces.  Low-NOx 
burner technologies also exist for cyclone turbines.  The FLOX combustion process achieves 
reductions by lowering peak flame temperature.  Water injection systems for cyclone boilers 
lower the peak combustion temperature, reduce heat loss to the combustion chamber, and 
improve compression by increasing the fuel-to-air ratio. Therefore, these solutions had the added 
benefit of increasing efficiency, making them even more cost effective (IEA Clean Coal Centre, 
2008). 
When the NBP took effect in 1998, these cheaper methods of reducing emissions had 
largely been exhausted.  Selective catalytic reduction (SCR) and ―scrubber‖ technologies could 
reduce NOx emissions further yet by 75-90% but required a huge investment.  The emissions 
cap, in combination with a more limited set of control options available, made these back-end 
solutions even costlier.   This led most utilities to avoid such capital costs during the first year of 
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the program by instead making operational changes, such as load shifting and importing power 
from outside the OTC region.  When affected sources could not do this or did not have enough 
time to make the capital investment necessary for control technology this created an unexpected 
demand for allowances before the program even began (Huetteman, 2002). 
  A volatile market reflected the perceived shortage in supply of allowances at first. 
Allowance prices in late 1998, and even into 1999 after the NBP took effect, actually traded at 
above the average cost of control.  Many expected that the price of allowances would be 
influenced by fuel costs, which are also volatile, but the well-established costs of emission 
control technology would lend them stability (Colburn, 1996).  Economists have attributed the 
early difficulties to market uncertainty.  Pointing to the lack of a mechanism for price discovery 
prior to the NBP, many have suggested holding early auctions or granting early reduction 
allowances as a way to avoid this in the future (Auslisi et al., 2005). 
The initial spike subsided as the market began to adapt and become more active.  
Allowance prices settled to around $1000 per ton of NOx by the end of 1999 after having been 
above $5000 at the beginning of the year.  New Hampshire played prominently in reducing 
allowance demand with its introduction of early reduction allowances in April and the timely 
installation of control technology on many of its plants.  Companies began to respond to the 
economic incentives associated with reducing emissions as allowance trading increased and the 
market matured.  Despite early misgivings and anxiety, the government‘s unwavering support for 
the market system enabled it to operate efficiently and reduce NOx emissions without any form 
of price trigger or safety valve. 
Certainty is hugely important for electric utilities, and the government‘s ability to provide 
it ultimately decides the performance of a cap and trade system.  The NBP was able to ensure a 
certain environmental outcome; the same would have been unlikely if it had included a price 
control mechanism (Pizer, 1999).  The use of allowance banking combined with a flow control 
mechanism maintained the environmental benefits of the program while actually increasing long-
term economic certainty for the regulated sources.  In the late stages of the program, price 
volatility was once again tied to uncertainty – that surrounding the anticipated federal program 
(Huetteman, 2002). 
Recognizing the immutable nature of the electric power industry is critical in developing 
a strategy for emissions reductions.  Power generators stress the fact that their foremost concern 
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is producing enough electricity to satisfy demand, usually based on long term contracts, and 
guaranteeing reliability to the electric grid.  While it is not their expressed interest to pollute as 
much as possible, there exists a tremendous institutional hurdle in regulating emission sources on 
the scale needed to slow the effects of climate change.  The OTC states appear to have 
understood this because the NBP budget was in excess of actual emissions by 10% over the life 
of the program (EPA, 2003).  Although it could have been more effective with a tighter cap, 
proving that cap and trade works and securing cooperation from the industry was more important 
in the long term.  
  
2.3.3 Lessons for CO2 Cap and Trade 
 
The environmental threats posed by CO2 and NOx pollution are best defined in terms of 
time and space.  Acid rain materializes faster and is localized in comparison to global warming.  
The usefulness of the NBP as functional model then is clearly limited but a comparison can still 
be made taking these differences into account.  Stopping climate change will also be as much a 
political feat as a technological one.  Not only must the government create a functioning program 
but it must secure public confidence in it as well, the NBP being a case in point. 
Both emissions are tied to fossil fuel-fired electric generation – primarily coal – but their 
chemical roles in it create some major differences in how they can be controlled.  NOx is formed 
as a byproduct of combustion under certain conditions but is not directly linked to power output.  
Its formation can be reduced to a limited extent by changing certain variables and methods of the 
combustion process, with front-end control technologies such as those previously discussed.  The 
formation of CO2 is a necessary byproduct of hydrocarbon combustion and is directly related to 
power output.  This also makes it easier to monitor CO2 emissions because they can be inferred 
by amount of fuel consumed rather than measured directly as NOx emissions are. 
Effective reductions in CO2 emissions will require switching away from fossil fuels and 
replacing fossil fuel-fired generation units entirely.  For this reason, the timeline for reducing 
CO2 emissions is currently measured in decades while the necessary reduction in NOx emissions 
was accomplished in a matter of years.  There is a possibility that back-end retrofitting for CO2 
emissions will become a viable option in the future.  However, it is unlikely that such technology 
will reach the same level of availability or affordability of NOx scrubbers and SCR, which are 
already considered expensive.  Still, carbon sequestration could end up being relatively cheaper 
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than building a new plant altogether, so its demonstrated success would certainly be a game-
changer. 
Emissions reductions will be capital intensive for CO2 as they were for NOx, and the 
economic factors in making those decisions will similarly depend on how cap and trade 
influences market conditions.  Though the two programs target the same sector, the effects will 
be felt differently in the case of CO2 and will be much more dependent on the economy as a 
whole.  The consequences of stopping global warming or allowing it to continue will be 
extensive either way.  The primary benefits will be felt in the long term, while the cost of making 
reductions will be felt immediately.  This was not the case with NOx because acid rain posed 
tangible environmental costs in the present, so the benefits of controlling emissions were easily 
quantifiable. 
There will be secondary benefits from CO2 cap and trade that can increase the efficiency 
of the CO2 cap and trade program.  The NBP did not impact electric rates in a significant way 
and relied entirely on pressure between producers.  Investments in control technology not only 
gave electric utilities an advantage over their competitors within the program, but had the added 
benefit of improving plant efficiency.  CO2 cap and trade can also incentivize gains in efficiency, 
but they will most likely go to consumers.  Electric demand will be a critical component of this 
system, shifting in response to higher electric rates and putting additional pressure on producers 
of electricity.  Fundamental changes in energy consumption and electric generation did not occur 
in NOx cap and trade, whereas with CO2 they play a central role in reducing emissions. 
With this huge potential for economic change, a CO2 cap and trade program must contain 
safeguards against price spikes.  While allowance prices were volatile during the early and late 
stages of the NBP, decisions over compliance options were also being made in a shorter 
timeframe.  Affected sources will need more price stability to plan the major investments needed 
to control CO2 emissions.  Price discovery is an important way to avoid the initial volatility that 
was seen in the NBP and could best be accomplished through an auction.  This would also 
provide a revenue stream to increase the secondary benefits of the program, creating positive 
feedback loops not present in the NBP.  Price controls might also be appropriate in this case as 
well.  While they can dilute the effectiveness of cap and trade, volatility poses a greater threat to 
the success of the program. 
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Apart from the technical aspects of the program itself, the policy environment 
surrounding it may give us more useful information about how CO2 cap and trade will fare.  The 
political history of the NBP provides a model that is reproducible and entirely applicable to CO2 
cap and trade.  State officials and regulators have followed such blueprint in creating a new 
regional cap and trade program and have seen similar success in terms of stakeholder 
participation.  As it was with the NBP, the real intention of a regional cap and trade program is 
not just to demonstrate the effectiveness of the model but to position these early states with an 
eye toward future federal policy.  The agreements and concessions required to secure broad 
support for these regional programs were based on this expectation.  In the case of the NBP, 
these state agreements were honored when the program was rolled into the NOx SIP Call.  There 
is no way to know if this will hold true for CO2 cap and trade.  With the ability of Congress to 
preempt state action to reduce CO2 emissions, the regional program could tentatively be reduced 
to a public relations effort aimed at influencing this debate. 
Though it is likely that a federal cap will undermine or do away with an existing regional 
program, states will continue to lead the way in defining environmental policy as a whole.  The 
cap and trade program, as only one component of an effort to stop global warming, will have a 
direct effect on the allocation of resources and the size of the political battle that surrounds it is 
best waged on the national or international level.  Innovative public programs will be required to 
support this policy and apportion the benefits from it efficiently.  New Hampshire has been 
exemplary thus far in creating a consistent policy direction that helped shape national policy.  
The state needs to reinforce the cap and trade program and take aggressive action beyond it in 
order to continue making this case as the rest of America looks on. 
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3 Methodology 
 
The proposed cap and trade program was studied in an unorthodox approach, as both a 
legislator and a student.  Research was conducted primarily through my role as a policymaker 
and the close interaction this gave me with other parties surrounding this issue.  That legislative 
perspective supplements my perspective as a student using traditional methods of research and 
analysis. 
 The project began with my participation in the deliberations on HB 1434 in my capacity 
as a New Hampshire state representative.  I sat on the policy committee responsible for doing the 
largest share of the work on the bill as it made its way through the legislature.  The qualitative 
and quantitative information that I accumulated through this experience served the dual purpose 
of informing my political actions as an elected official and forming a basis for my research 
during this project. 
 
3.1  Qualitative Research Methods 
 
 The qualitative data collection in this phase of the project consisted of observations made 
through field research.  My research was conducted using a form of participant observation.  
Common to the study of social sciences, participant observation is summarized below: 
The method of data collection most closely associated with field research is participant 
observation, the process through which the investigator attempts to obtain membership in 
or a close attachment to the group he or she wishes to study.  The researcher can assume 
either a complete participant role or a participant-as-observer role.  Complete participants 
conceal their identities and do not make their research objectives known, whereas 
participants-as-observers make their presence known to the group being studied 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996, p. 281). 
There are many subjective observations to be made in a legislative setting.  In most instances, my 
investigative interests for the project overlapped with my legislative prerogatives.  There were 
some observations, which I normally would not record in the course of my legislative work, that 
were still in keeping with my goals as an elected official and actually aided me in achieving 
them.  None of these observations required me to step into an exclusively participant-as-observer 
role, and in almost all instances I chose to stay a complete observer. 
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There are some methodological and ethical caveats on being a participant observer, 
particularly in the complete participant role (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996, p. 284; 
Babbie, 1989, p. 264).  A phenomenon can occur, known as the Hawthorne effect, whereby the 
outcome of the process being observed is influenced, directly or indirectly, by the presence of the 
researcher.  There is also the risk of ―going native,‖ or assimilating to the point where the 
objectivity of one‘s research is in question.  And lastly, there is a moral question about hiding 
one‘s identity as a researcher. 
In its dual nature, as previously described, this project is presumed to be unique.  While 
the explicit focus of my research is on a specific policy proposal, research was implied in my 
overall experience as a college student serving in the state legislature.  I began my term in public 
office a year prior to the commencement of this project with the intent of serving the public good 
while furthering my education.  I requested placement on the STE committee with the sole 
interest of conducting research on a topic such as this one.  In that way, it resembles the act of an 
observer assuming the role of a participant and is truly academic in nature.   
The process of developing a relationship with the community and persons under 
observation, I believe, leaves me subject to some level of scrutiny.  The exercise of my own 
political authority is an obvious way in which the process might have been altered by my 
presence as a researcher, although my own decisions are included among the topics covered in 
this project.  However, the goals of choosing the best policy and promoting the interests of NH‘s 
citizens are not at odds with one another, so my participation in voting could be considered an 
added benefit to the project.   
The only concern should be the question of my objectivity; the project depends on my 
having already ―gone native.‖  In my qualitative research, there was no fine line between 
subjective observations and personal opinion and the resulting notes and data were not absolute 
in this regard.  The important step was in screening out information that was not objective and 
then in using sound methods of analytic induction.  
Although the environment I studied was by its very nature morally ambiguous, there were 
few ethical considerations associated with my method of research.  A primary concern for the 
public interest did not in any way inhibit me from taking on a complete observer role.  I faced 
only one personal ethical decision over whether or not to alert my colleagues about my research 
objectives.  I decided to assume a participant-as-observer role among my fellow committee 
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members, due to the relationships of trust I had built with them over time.  Particularly esteemed 
was the subcommittee chair for having been my seatmate and confidant from the time we were 
elected as freshmen and the committee vice-chair for having carpooled with me occasionally. 
 My role as a genuine participant in this process was arguably the defining feature of my 
project.  Mine was the best position from which to document the nuances and subtleties of the 
legislative process.  My familiarity and unrestricted access to the actors surrounding this policy 
provided me with an enriched perspective from which to evaluate it. 
 
3.2  Quantitative Research Methods 
 
 The quantitative data collected during this phase of the project was another major asset.  I 
worked with HB 1434 up close in STE and took away a full portfolio containing all of the 
written material that was used by the legislature to evaluate it.  I used also my power as a 
representative to call upon additional resources from public and private entities, giving me 
potentially unlimited access to material data without having to search for it myself. 
 I was provided with current scientific and policy reports pertaining to the problem and its 
proposed solution.  All the relevant background information was supplied by government 
officials and lobbyists for the interest groups, explaining their relationships to the problem and 
their positions on the proposed solution.  In addition to the hard copies given to me directly, I 
was given access to the entire legislative file on HB 1434, consisting of all the evidence and 
transcripts recorded by the committee clerk and staff.  Lobbyists also assisted by supplying 
information that filled gaps in my record and by providing additional context to the public 
discussions.  The legislative budget, drafting, and research offices were also available to answer 
legal and financial questions with respect to state government. 
 What resulted was a comprehensive collection of documents resembling what an outside 
researcher might have accumulated with much effort.  This information constitutes the basis on 
which I evaluated HB 1434 in my role as a policymaker.  It also guided and supplemented 
further research in the project.  
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3.3  Legislative Process 
 
The qualitative and quantitative research methods were used in a structured approach 
based around the legislative process.  Each interaction in my role as policymaker required 
different levels of communication and decorum, and therefore provided varying opportunities for 
collecting quantitative and qualitative data.  Explicating this research environment was first 
necessary to explain what the competing interests were, where the areas of conflict were and how 
they were resolved, and how HB 1434 reached its final form.  Figure 1 outlines the legislative 
process: 
 
 
Figure 3-1:  Legislative Flowchart 
 
 There were legislative briefings prior to the hearings which were publicly noticed but 
intended for the benefit of legislators.  These were full of useful historical and background 
information and devoted a generous block of time for questions to be answered.  The question 
and answer period was an opportunity to preview the inclinations and concerns of fellow 
committee members and interest groups, providing social and political context for the formal 
legislative process that followed. 
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 The committee meetings were the most formal stage of the process.  The public hearing 
especially has become almost a formality in terms of importance.  Written testimony submitted 
during the hearing contributed somewhat to my quantitative research with most of it being 
repetitive.  Subcommittee hearings or work sessions are the venue where powerful interest 
groups clashed.  This point in the process was more useful for collecting qualitative data.  Formal 
parliamentary rules still apply in these meetings, creating an environment where tensions are 
high and yet subtle actions and behavior are more easily noticed.  Attention to whispers, looks, 
body language, seating arrangement, and people entering and exiting the committee room is 
important for understanding what is actually happening in the negotiation process. 
 The most decisive vote on the bill was taken during general floor sessions of the House 
and Senate.  There were no significant policy modifications made to the bill on the House floor.  
Floor amendments are much more common in the Senate so this point was the last chance for 
special interests have their demands met.  Partisanship arose during the politically-charged floor 
debate and the ensuing level of support the bill received was indicative of how the public and the 
media perceive the issue.  After the policy committees‘ recommendations were acted on by the 
entire bodies, the respective House and Senate leaders decided whether to refer the bill to a 
second committee for further deliberation.  
Private discussions were an important tool for both quantitative and qualitative research.  
Much of the process took place outside of the committee room behind closed-door or hallway 
conversations. Lobbyists or other actors involved in the process reveal more about their positions 
in this setting, either through direct advocacy or by asking leading questions.  Such discussions 
between legislators were more informal and also produced information that had not been stated 
publicly.  These happened frequently in the House chamber and antechambers, both restricted to 
legislators.  My assigned seat next to a fellow committee member was understandably another 
major asset in this method of research. 
  Written correspondence was the least effective tool for research.  Constituents and 
interest groups sent us an overwhelming amount of post and e-mail building up to the critical 
votes that were taken on HB 1434.  Most were simple declarations of support or opposition but 
there were rare instances where these sources contributed new information.  They were useful for 
documenting the stated interests of certain groups ―on paper,‖ which were modified during the 
process and at times contradicted their true interests.  
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4 House Bill 1434 
 
 House Bill 1434, an act relative to the regional greenhouse gas initiative and authorizing 
a cap-and-trade program for controlling carbon dioxide emissions, was considered by the New 
Hampshire General Court during the 2008 legislative session.  The bill‘s prime sponsor was 
Representative Naida Kaen, the chair of STE.  It was cosponsored by the vice-chair, a third 
member of the committee, and five senators including the Senate President, Sylvia Larsen, and 
the chair of Energy, Environment & Economic Development, Martha Fuller-Clark.  This 
powerful lineup shows how greatly anticipated the bill was.  HB 1434 resulted from over four 
years of pre-legislative planning, a process referred to as RGGI. 
 
4.1 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is an effort by ten Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic States to develop and implement a regional CO2 cap and trade system.  The participating 
states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont, and observers to the process are the District of 
Columbia, Pennsylvania, New Brunswick, Ontario, Quebec, and the Eastern Canadian Provinces. 
RGGI was created in response to the 2001 NEG/ECP Climate Change Action Plan and 
Climate Plans in each of the individual states calling for GHG emissions reductions in the 
electric utility sector.  The effort began informally in April 2003 at the invitation of NY Gov. 
George Pataki.  The responding states began discussion of a cap and trade program in August of 
that year through the formation of the RGGI Staff Working Group, made up of governors‘ staff 
and state regulatory officials.  The group drafted a two-year action plan setting an overall goal 
and action items to be carried out by different task subgroups.
4
   
A timeline divided the planning process into learning and development phases.  The 
learning phase was used to collect background information on the states‘ GHG reduction policies 
and legal mechanisms that they would use to implement a new one.  The development phase 
contained the work of the task subgroups as well as a stakeholder process.  NH was assigned to 
work on the Data Gathering & Technical Analysis and Model Rule Development subgroups, in 
addition to planning the stakeholder process.  The stakeholder process allowed interested parties 
                                                 
4
 The RGGI Staff Working Group Action Plan can be viewed at http://www.rggi.org/docs/actionplanfinal.pdf 
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in the private sector to follow the development of the program and submit input for its design as 
well as comments on the outputs of the Staff Working Group.  Among the stakeholders were 
major organizations from the electric utility and manufacturing industries and environmental 
community. 
The development phase concluded with a formal agreement by the states, in the 2005 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), to participate a regional cap and trade system.  The 
MOU called for the creation of RGGI, Inc., a non-profit organization to oversee the regional 
program and provide support functions to the states.  Commissioners from the NH DES and PUC 
both sit on the Board of Directors of RGGI, Inc.  The MOU was followed in early 2006 with the 
creation of the Model Rule which served as a framework for the RGGI program.  The MOU and 
Model Rule established the basic components of the regional system but also left considerable 
flexibility for state implementation.  The major components of RGGI are summarized in Table 1: 
Table 4-1:  Major Components of RGGI: 
Component Model Rule/MOU State Authority 
Applicability Generation of 25 MW and over 
Exemption for biomass facilities 
Define ―sustainable‖ 
biomass fuel sources 
Cap Compliance over three-year period 
Stabilizes current emission levels during 
first two compliance periods 
Decreases by 2.5% each year thereafter – 
achieves a 10% reduction by 2018 
None 
Budget 
Allowances 
NH: 8.6 million allowances/yr 
Region: 188 million allowances/yr 
Unlimited banking 
None 
Auction 25% auction for consumer benefit Allocate 75% of allowances 
Auction design 
Bonus 
Allowances 
Converted from Early Reduction 
Allowances 
Early Reduction period from 2006 to 2008 
Limits on use 
Conversion factor 
Offset 
Allowances 
Limited to 3.3% of total emissions 
Limited to US projects:  
Afforestation 
End-use Efficiency 
None 
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Landfill Methane capture 
Livestock Methane reduction 
Sulfur Hexafluoride reduction  
Price 
Triggers
5
 
Allowance price of $7: 
Offset limit increases to 5% 
Allowance price of $10:   
Compliance extends to 4 years 
Offset limit increases to 10% 
International offsets accepted 
None 
Voluntary 
Retirement 
Allocated Allowances retired for 
renewable energy purchases 
Ineligible towards RPS and vice-versa 
RPS participation 
Source: RGGI Inc., 2007
                                                 
5
 Based on a twelve-month rolling average 
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4.2  Presentation on HB 1434 
 
  HB 1434 was introduced and referred to STE on January 2, 2008.  The bill was presented 
to the committee for the first time the following morning, at a general information session in 
Representative‘s Hall conducted by the DES.  We also received material from an earlier DES 
briefing from September 24, 2007, detailing the final contents of the RGGI MOU and Model 
Rule. 
 We were informed that the bill would delegate most of the regulatory authority to the 
department, which had been responsible for the comparable Federal Acid Rain Program before.  
This would mean that most of the decisions would be made through administrative rulemaking 
rather than in statute.  We also found out that the bill would have most of the budget allowances 
sold, and that the auction revenues would go towards energy efficiency. 
 An economist then presented a report on auction design done by the University of 
Virginia (Holt, Shobe, Burtraw, Palmer & Goeree, 2007).  He identified competition, fairness 
and resistance to collusion as the most important goals and recommended a uniform price, 
sealed-bid auction done regionally instead of state-by-state (Shobe, 2008).  He also defused 
concerns that speculation and hoarding might compromise the effectiveness of the program.  I 
spoke to the economist during lunch and he explained for me the superiority of a carbon tax over 
cap and trade in terms of price signals and efficiency.  He implied that cap and trade was the 
more politically expedient of the two policies. 
 A question and answer session followed, where we learned from the Public Utilities 
Commissioner that the MOU had anticipated a federal cap and trade program in the future, and 
that the regional would transition over in that case.  Representative John Thomas stood out as a 
skeptic of the trading program, worrying that an outsider such as George Soros might try to game 
the system by buying up allowances so that they couldn‘t be used.  We also witnessed the first 
exchange in what would clearly become a heated dispute on the subject of Bonus Allowances.  
PSNH claimed that it was entitled to 32 million, earned through the Clean Power Act, while the 
DES said it was 4 only million.   
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4.3  Public Hearing 
 
The public hearing on HB 1434 was likely the largest of any in the 2008 session.  The 
hearing was scheduled for two consecutive Thursdays, January 10
th
 and 17
th
, and was held in 
Representative‘s Hall instead of the regular committee room.  Over a hundred people attended 
and the majority chose to submit written testimony instead of signing up to speak.  The speakers 
represented a good cross-section of the parties surrounding the legislation, and all but a few 
voiced strong support for it.  Although much of the testimony was repetitive and easy to 
anticipate there was enough useful information in the oral remarks to fill ten pages worth of 
notes.  While many public hearings serve as no more than a tradition of the democratic process, 
attendance at this particular one was important for all the committee members and interested 
parties who wanted to be involved in the discussion. 
 The first speakers were elected officials, generally placed in order of importance and 
relation to the bill.  The prime sponsor came up first and quickly yielded the floor to the 
Governor.  Governor Lynch rarely attends legislative hearings so this attracted media attention.  
He stated that there is a need for national action and changes in our energy policy to address 
global warming but that we cannot wait for this to happen and must instead take the first step 
ourselves.  He also stated that New Hampshire will be affected by RGGI regardless of whether 
or not we participate and that we should choose to accept the benefits that it will offer the state in 
the area of energy efficiency.  The vice-chair of STE testified after this, speaking of the 
complementary relationship that this program would have with the RPS, which also operates in a 
regional market.  A staffer then testified on behalf of the House Majority Leader, suggesting that 
this program would have both environmental and economic benefits to the state if we participate.  
DES began to speak next, but their testimony was interrupted midway to accommodate the 
schedules of several elected officials.  Senator Larsen impressed upon us that this was the most 
important initiative that the legislature would vote on this session.  Senator Fuller-Clark then 
characterized the program as ―forward-looking‖ and pointed out that under it the state would 
retain the right to decide how allowances are used.  The last elected official to speak was 
Executive Councilor Raymond Burton, a Republican, who testified in favor.  It became apparent 
by this point that success for the bill was seen as crucial albeit politically advantageous, and 
worth expending political capital if required. 
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 DES provided the most in-depth and knowledgeable testimony and was the first to 
entertain questions at the hearing.  Commissioner Tom Burack submitted four pages of written 
testimony and opted not to take up any time speaking, yielding the floor to Director Bob Scott 
for a PowerPoint presentation (Burack & Scott, 2008).  Mr. Scott started off by drawing a 
connection between global warming and New Hampshire‘s recent severe weather and flood 
emergencies.  He then gave future changes predicted for NH‘s climate if warming trends are not 
reversed.  He stated that the winter season would be cut in half, the sea level would rise upwards 
of three feet, we would experience sixty days of 90°+ and between four and twenty-eight days of 
100°+ temperatures each year, the state would see a 0.5 – 1% decline in GSP due to extreme 
weather events and would see a 5-20% decrease in consumption annually, and that the insurance 
markets are already reacting in advance of these changes.  Much of this was an implicit reference 
to NH‘s economic prosperity, which depends heavily on tourism during ski season.  He 
concluded these warnings by making an example of the UK, where CO2 emissions were reduced 
by 14% from 1990 to 1999 and saw increases of 15% in growth and 5% in jobs during the same 
period. 
 Mr. Scott‘s testimony then transitioned over to what effect RGGI would have for NH.  
Providing context first, he informed us that the multi-state region covered by RGGI represents 
the seventh highest emitting country in the world, larger than Australia, France or Italy.  He told 
us that energy prices in that regional market, from which we purchase 50% of our electricity, will 
be affected by the program no matter what.  He said the only way to mitigate those costs will be 
to participate, allowing us to benefit from the sale of allowances and have influence on the 
program itself.   
 Mr. Scott suggested that using the revenue from allowances on energy efficiency would 
be most beneficial to the state.  He informed us that NH‘s peak demand during the summer has 
risen to 28,000 MW and that it is growing at twice the rate of average load.  He said that 
reducing demand by 5% during peak usage would save the state $580 million each year.  This 
could be aided by the creation of a fuel-neutral fund, along with the improving technologies and 
varying opportunities, resulting in energy efficiency improvements that help us avoid the 
construction of more generating capacity. 
 Mr. Scott finished making his case in favor of the program by pointing to outside sources.  
He pointed to the analysts at ISO-NE, the quasigovernmental organization that operates the 
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regional energy market, who say that RGGI will work due to transparent prices, open access, and 
regional transmission planning within the system.  He highlighted the positive results of a UNH 
economic impact study, which said that the benefits to household utility bills would be seen as 
early as 2012.  He left us with the prospects that the program could bring in the area of research 
and development, citing Powerspan (CO2 capture) and GT Solar (photovoltaic technology) as 
examples of innovation and leadership in NH. 
 At this point, after yielding to the Senators and Councilor, Mr. Scott went into a technical 
overview of the program.  Most of what was said in this part was previously covered in the 
briefing.  He did draw attention to areas of the bill which would require decisions by the 
legislature, particularly conversion of CPA allowances, auction of allowances, and usage of 
auction revenue.  The bill as introduced would leave the bonus allowance issue for DES to 
resolve, auction all of the remaining allowances, and have the PUC administer an Energy 
Efficiency fund to use the revenues for improvements both in and outside of the utility sector 
with 5% designated for LIHEAP.  The bill would also keep 1% of allowances set aside for 
voluntary retirement through REC purchases. 
 Questions at the conclusion of his testimony focused generally on the energy efficiency 
programs.  Representative Andersen rhetorically asked how it was fair for only 5% of the 
revenues to be devoted to low-income assistance.  Representative Thomas was once again 
skeptical, implying that there were constitutional issues with targeting revenues to other sectors 
while consumers were being hit on their electric bills, and also wondering why a multi-state 
organization like RGGI should get to decide what qualifies as an offset.  Both of his concerns 
were addressed by Mr. Scott. 
 The next speaker was Public Utilities Commissioner Cliff Below, who had been the 
agency head leading NH‘s contingent to RGGI.  The only thing he had to add to DES‘ testimony 
was on the nature of the RGGI discussions, which he said had involved a lot of collaboration 
between DES, PUC, and the Consumer Advocate with outside agencies. 
 The Director of the Office of Energy and Planning, Amy Ignatius, reminded us that this 
legislation is another piece in the Governor‘s 25 x ‗25 renewable energy commitment and 
strongly urged that it be passed this year and not delayed through a study committee. 
 The Consumer Advocate, Meredith Hatfield, expressed support for the aims of the 
program and NH‘s participation in it as being in the interest of residential ratepayers.  She 
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expressed two main concerns regarding the design of the program in NH.  The first was how the 
revenues are used, recommending that 100% go towards coordinated, multi-fuel energy 
efficiency programs, including those to benefit low-income customers.  The second was the 
initial cost impact on ratepayers, recommending that mechanisms be included in the overall 
program and auction that will provide price protection to consumers.  She suggested the specific 
approach of setting a maximum price for allowances.  Representative Thomas reiterated his 
concerns about the cost to ratepayers but was skeptical about Ms. Hatfield‘s recommendations 
for how to address this. 
  Ross Gittell, from UNH‘s Whittemore School of Business and Economics, delivered to 
us an independent assessment on RGGI, with the help of his understudy, Matt Magnuson.  Their 
oral remarks were accompanied by a PowerPoint presentation summarizing the methodology and 
findings of their economic analysis and a FAQ prepared with the help of DES (Gittell & 
Magnusson, 2008; DES, 2008).  Their methodology used a review of existing REMI analysis and 
documentation, current information on the NH economy and electricity market, consumption and 
price forecasts from ISO-NE, and input from stakeholders (Petraglia & Lynch, 2004).  Using 
previous studies they determined that NH should participate in RGGI regardless of allowance 
pricing.  Their ratepayer impact study found that a residential customer with a $90/month electric 
bill would see a negative impact of $0.96/month initially but a positive impact of $1.46 over the 
long term and businesses investing in energy efficiency would see even greater savings.  Their 
economy-wide impact study found that using auction revenues for corporate tax relief would 
provide the greatest boost in GSP with moderate job growth, and investing it in 100% energy 
efficiency would increase the GSP only half as much but result in greater job growth.  Other 
important points were brought up in their presentation were that 100% energy efficiency is the 
only scenario that benefits all ratepayers, that going with corporate tax relief would have the 
highest cost to ratepayers, and that PSNH customers will be affected differently by RGGI in that 
they will see higher costs then if we do participate than if we do not.  The committee found this 
information to be sufficient and did not ask any questions. 
 The testimony for rest of the hearing was not pre-planned and speakers were called 
according to their position on the sign-in sheet.  The first was Brett Lamb, Planning Director for 
the City of Keene.  He told us that cities have a lot at stake in the cap and trade program, as many 
have implemented or are in the process of implementing climate action plans.  He elaborated on 
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Keene‘s Climate Action Plan established in 2004, and included an inventory which found that 
buildings and transportation were each responsible for 30% of emissions.  The plan set a 
reduction target of pre-1995 emissions levels, with a 10% residential goal and a 20% municipal 
goal.  He described how the city was reducing emissions by using LED bulbs, instituting an 
―anti-idling‖ campaign and a biodiesel program for vehicles, installing geothermal heating and 
methane-to-energy recovery units, and creating renewable energy tax credits.  We were also 
presented with a summary report of Keene‘s Climate Adaptation Action Plan (City of Keene, 
2004).
6
 
 A policy analyst from Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships, Natalie Levitt, 
advocated directing revenue into existing energy efficiency programs and to avoid creating new 
programs that duplicate or compete with existing ones.  She also submitted a report on the 
potential for energy efficiency in New England (Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships Inc., 
2005). 
 A concerned citizen from Fremont, Neil Rowland, questioned the underlying basis for the 
program.  He challenged the assumption that anthropogenic climate change is scientifically 
accepted, and accused Al Gore of propagating theory of global warming to amass personal 
wealth.  In regards to the bill, he spoke of a conversation he had with Commissioner Below in 
which he learned that NH is actually net exporter of electricity despite purchasing half of what it 
consumes from the regional market.  He urged against participating in regional programs such as 
RGGI, citing the Northeast Blackout of 2003 as a reason why interdependence is bad for 
reliability.  A few committee members did not show restraint in assailing Mr. Rowland during 
his questioning.  Representative Garrity was able to break the tension with some light-hearted 
humor.  While it was apparent that Mr. Rowland‘s did not represent the mainstream of political 
views, other committee members felt that he had the right to be heard without being mocked. 
 The town planner from the town of Epping, Clay Mitchell, insisted that municipalities 
were uniquely qualified to benefit from and implement the cap and trade program.  It was 
quickly understood that he was referring to the energy efficiency component as he went on to 
describe energy assistance and efficiency programs in his own town.  He hoped that we could 
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 Keene was the first of five U.S. cities to participate in the Climate Resilient Communities pilot program run by the 
International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives. 
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use the revenues to jumpstart a ―new alignment,‖ which he described as a transition towards 
more efficiency that would reduce the need for general assistance. 
 The first speaker from an environmental interest group was Doug Bogen, representing 
Clean Water Action.  He supplied a general history of environmental actions taken by the state, 
wanting to provide context to RGGI.  He pointed out that our previous commitments had set a 
10% reduction goal by 2010, not 2018 as contained in HB 1434.  He urged us to act timely in 
passing the bill, saying that we cannot weaken it any further because many compromises and 
concessions have already been made. 
 The first person to testify on behalf of a business interest was Jeff Rose, Director of 
Government Relations for BAE Systems.  I learned from his written testimony that BAE‘s 
Electronics and Integrated Solutions plant in Nashua employs 4,700 people, is the largest 
manufacturer in the state, and that 35% of its expenses are related to its energy costs.  He told us 
that BAE had some objections with the bill, while appreciating its goal of addressing global 
warming.  He said they are concerned because energy costs are at record highs and he 
recommended that the program revenues be returned to industry.  Representative Kaelin wanted 
to know if BAE participates in any of the energy efficiency programs funded by the System 
Benefits Charge.  Mr. Rose responded that they do but that he did not know to what extent. 
 The second business interest to testify was Nancy Hirshberg, Vice President of Natural 
Resources for Stonyfield Farm.  She expressed strong support for RGGI and recommended two 
areas to focus on.  The first was the impact and the second was competitiveness.  She said that 
the environmental impact on businesses would be worse than the short-term cost of cap and 
trade.  She also told us that Stonyfield spends $2 million/year on energy and has saved $1.7 
million since 1995 due to efficiency measures. 
 The next speaker was Erika Staaf of Environment NH, but she immediately yielded to 
Will Abbott, Vice President of Policy and Land Management at the Society for the Protection of 
NH Forests.  He informed us that his 10,000 member organization was working in cooperation 
with Environment NH and the conservation community in supporting HB 1434.  He insisted that 
using open markets as would be done in RGGI is the best way to get the desired results.  He also 
expressed optimism that it would encourage other conservation measures, suggesting that 
timberland owners could receive credit for carbon storage in trees. 
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 A lobbyist delivered testimony authored by Jim Roche, President of the NH Business and 
Industry Association (BIA), which had not yet taken an official position on HB 1434.  He began 
by lauding the goal of addressing climate change but told us that he would mainly be discussing 
their concerns with the legislation.  He listed concerns regarding the open auction that were 
similar to what Representative Thomas had spoke of previously.  The next concern took the form 
of a set of questions asking whether or not certain events might occur, should a generator use up 
all of its allowances before the end of a compliance period.  The BIA also felt that there should 
be constitutional protections on how and where program revenues could be used, similar to those 
governing the Highway Trust Fund.  Their final point suggested that we consider potential 
negatives impacts that the state could encounter if a national cap and trade program is instituted.  
There were no questions at the end of this testimony, out of fairness to the lobbyist and the 
author of the testimony who was not present. 
 STE does not normally consider religious interests but the HB 1434 hearing was so large 
that we were not surprised when Jane Dougherty from the Episcopal Diocese of New Hampshire 
testified.  A member of the Faith-Environment Network, she told us she was speaking on behalf 
of congregations and normal voters who support the legislation.  She informed us that the 
National Council of Churches has supported cap and trade since before the UN IPCC‘s studies 
began.  She said that we needed to fulfill our moral obligation and start now because we ―only 
have a few years,‖ according to the IPCC.  
We then heard from Jim Grady, President of LighTec which is the state‘s largest provider 
of high efficiency lighting systems and ENERGY STAR® products. He gave testimony that 
revenues should be directed away from renewables and towards existing energy efficiency 
methods that have proven success and cost much less.   
Susan Arnold of the Appalachian Mountain Club came next but decided to yield the floor 
to Jim O‘Brien of Granite State Conservation Voters.  He described how the environmental 
community was approaching HB 1434 in a united front and intended to be active in committee 
discussions.  Their coalition consisted of the Appalachian Mountain Club, Audubon Society, 
Clean Water Action, Environmental Defense Fund, Environment NH, Society for Protection of 
NH Forests, Granite State Conservation Voters, Nature Conservancy, and NH Rivers Council, 
with the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) and Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) heading 
up their advocacy team. 
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Bruce Berke came next, representing Ski NH.  He told us that the state‘s ski areas all are 
in support of the bill because they are more affected by climate change than any other industry.  
He also informed us that most ski areas are currently taking advantage of SBC-funded programs 
due to the energy-intensive process of snowmaking.  Representative Garrity asked how business 
had been that winter so far and upon learning that it was going better than average joked that it 
disproves climate change. 
Erika Staaf from Environment NH came back up again to give her testimony, which 
responded to many criticisms or concerns that had been brought up by previous testimony.  The 
first point she made was this program will be important for setting the stage for a national cap 
and trade program.  Her second was that the benefits of the program could extend beyond the 
10% emissions reductions by helping the state transition into a ―clean energy economy,‖ but only 
if a 100% auction policy is adopted as soon as CPA expires.  Her last point was that there should 
not be any price caps on allowances because they would be pointless in a market-based system, 
saying that if there was a compelling case for a cap it would have been mentioned in the model 
rule. 
Susan Arnold of the Appalachian Mountain Club also returned to reclaim her time and 
briefly told us about current studies that were being done in high altitude ecosystems where the 
distinctive impacts of climate change were seen.  She urged us to move forward with the bill as 
introduced, without price caps. 
The opposition to price caps was repeated by Jim Ruben from UCS.  He ended the public 
hearing with the controversial statement that PSNH should be given 4 million bonus allowances 
from CPA. 
Noticeably absent from those who spoke at the public hearing were the electric utilities 
themselves.  PSNH had lobbyists present throughout the process but no testimony was submitted 
for the record, either oral or written.  National Grid did submit extensive written remarks in 
support of the program along with recommendations to make the cap tighter, auction 100% of 
the allowances, and devote 100% of the revenue to energy efficiency. 
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4.4  Work Sessions 
 
 Formal deliberation on HB 1434 resumed three weeks after the public hearing on 
Thursday, February 7
th
.  Representative Kaen appointed Representative Tom Fargo, a junior 
member of the committee, as chair of the subcommittee.  This effectively left Rep. Fargo in 
charge of STE during the work sessions because the subcommittee, unlike most others, included 
every member of the STE.  The work sessions were scheduled in a way to allow STE to take care 
of many smaller bills first before devoting its full attention to the cap and trade bill.  This also 
allowed more time for constituents to lobby members of the committee and for interest groups to 
determine their strategies.  The discussions that then occurred in these sessions, which were held 
over the course of two weeks, addressed all the points of conflict which would ultimately decide 
the fate of HB 1434. 
 The actors significantly involved in the subcommittee discussions were DES, PUC, 
PSNH, BIA, and UCS/CLF.  DES continued in its support role to the committee, authoring a 
draft amendment containing language that would address the main points of contention.  The 
DES draft also reorganized the structure of HB 1434 as written by OLS to give it functionality 
more in line with RGGI.  The other groups did not submit draft amendments, choosing instead to 
provide draft language to sympathetic members of STE.  Based on debate that the subcommittee 
had with the interested parties and among its members, a proposed amendment was agreed upon 
which closely resembled the DES draft. 
The work sessions began with consideration of three specific aspects of the bill.  Rep. 
Fargo enumerated these topics of discussion on a flipchart which was then used to record the 
main arguments pertaining to each.  These topics covered some portions of the bill which were 
not truly debatable because they were previously decided on in the MOU.  Others were not 
controversial and resulted in immediate decisions.  The most difficult decisions did not lend 
themselves much to these specific topics and succeeded the structured discussions in the form of 
a new dialogue which consumed most of our time in the work sessions. 
 
4.4.1  Auction 
 
 There was not much debate over the design of the auction.  Rep. Fargo presented the 
question of whether we should use a state auction or participate in the regional auction, then 
listing the arguments in favor of each.  A regional auction would be less volatile, easier to 
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administer, and thus less costly to the state.  A state-run auction could begin earlier and have a 
greater impact on the state, both positive and negative.  This, in addition to the UVA study 
recommendations and the lack of debate on the topic, made for an easy decision in favor of the 
regional auction and it was so voted. 
 The next decision was over how the allowances would be allocated.  This decision took 
into account two interrelated concerns.  The first was the impact the system would have on 
electricity prices for ratepayers.  The second was the systems effectiveness at reducing carbon 
emissions. 
We knew that at least 25% of the allowances had to be auctioned for consumer benefit or 
a strategic energy purpose, according to the RGGI agreement.  Rep. Fargo listed different 
activities which could fulfill those purposes.  We could use the revenue to promote energy 
efficiency, mitigate ratepayer impacts, promote renewable technologies, or stimulate investment 
in abatement.  Most members of the subcommittee liked best the idea of giving this money back 
directly to electric customers. 
After providing that context, Rep. Fargo then shifted the discussion slightly by telling us 
that NY, MA, VT, RI, CT and ME had all chosen to auction 100% of their allowances, to be 
used for energy efficiency.  He presented the argument, affirmed by the Gittell study, that under 
such a scenario the state would see the greatest benefit as it would both lower prices for 
consumers and meet the overall reduction goals more quickly.  The subcommittee was in general 
agreement that creating this dynamic between emission reductions and electricity prices was the 
best policy for NH, and leaned towards the 100% auction.   
 
4.4.2  Metrics 
 
 The subcommittee was in agreement over how to use the auction revenue and now 
needed to decide who would administer the funds and more importantly how to measure their 
progress.  Rep. Fargo asked us to view the program through a business perspective, focusing on 
―metrics‖ as a way to ensure its effectiveness. 
 Members of the subcommittee suggested different results-based methods.  We could look 
at the amount of money available for the SBC, expected to be about $20 million for 2008.  We 
could look at RPS revenue, projected to be between $8-9 million.  Someone also suggested using 
a CO2/kWh conversion. 
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 We looked to the DES draft, which contained new reporting requirements for the DES 
and PUC.  It proposed that they would issue an annual report to the legislature emphasizing the 
prices and availability of allowances and the trends in electric rates in the state.  It suggested 
reporting on the number of allowances sold and unsold, who was buying them, how much they 
sold for in the auction and secondary markets, how each state was spending auction revenues, 
emissions from each affected source and the emissions reductions associated with the spending 
of auction revenue.   
The draft also proposed the creation of a greenhouse gas emissions reduction fund 
administered by the PUC, and advisory board to issue recommendations for fund usage by 
reviewing energy efficiency and demand-side management programs in the state.  The fund 
would give money to programs which provide electric cost savings, reduce electric demand, or 
reduce emissions from fuels used to provide electricity, heating, and cooling in the state.  The 
legislature would also receive an annual PUC report justifying how the money was spent. 
The subcommittee approved the provisions for reporting by DES and PUC and creation 
of the emissions reduction fund.  Rep. Andersen informed us that the proposed advisory board 
would have overlapping functions with what was proposed in his bill.  HB 1561, which would 
have created an Energy Conservation and Efficiency Board, was much more comprehensive in 
terms of coordinating energy efficiency initiatives in the state, and Rep. Andersen proposed that 
we use its language in place of the advisory board provision.  Most of the subcommittee 
members expressed gratitude at this towards Rep. Andersen, who had built a reputation as a 
strong advocate for energy efficiency and conservation.  Rep. Thomas then raised concerns about 
having identical language in two separate bills, insisting that we could not keep both.  This was 
followed by a long debate over legal ramifications which was settled by Joel Anderson, our 
committee researcher, who explained how statutory precedence works. 
 
4.4.3  Volatility 
 
The next topic of discussion concerned how to limit risks to consumers.  Rep. Fargo first 
reminded us of price protections already built into the program, reviewing the trigger event 
provision that allows expanded use of offsets.  We then discussed the need for additional price 
controls. 
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The DES draft had set a price ―threshold‖ for allowances, at which point auction 
revenues would be rebated back to ratepayers.  The proposed threshold was $12/ton for 2009 to 
2010, $13/ton for the next two years, $14 for the following two years, and finally $15, at which 
point it would be pegged to the Consumer Price Index.  The environmental lobby reiterated their 
opposition to price controls, saying that this would defeat the point of auctioning allowances and 
weaken the cap and trade program.  The opponents of this provision were easily overpowered as 
the BIA and the Consumer Advocate both argued in favor of it.  Members of the subcommittee 
were generally more concerned with the short-term economic impact of the program in its 
beginning stages, but were still mindful of the long-term economic functionality it needed to 
have in order to be effective.  We decided on a compromise by agreeing to include the proposed 
threshold prices but to sunset them after 2015. 
 
4.4.4  Early Reduction Allowances 
 
 It was evident from previous statements that there was a looming conflict over the 
conversion of CPA allowances.  While it was known that PSNH would be granted allowances in 
return for their early emission reductions, the specific amount appeared to be open to 
interpretation.  The situation was complicated even further by the fact that PSNH was the only 
company in the region eligible for such allowances. 
The subject was broached during the work session by Donna Gamache of PSNH, joined 
by the company‘s corporate lawyer.  She issued a new claim of 41 million early reduction 
allowances, up from 32 million a month before.  She argued that ratepayers would need the 
benefit of these allowances due to rising energy prices with the added cost of cap and trade.  The 
attorney informed the committee that PSNH might sue the state if its expectations were not met.  
He told us that PSNH took a risk by spending $75 million dollars on the conversion of the 
Schiller unit, and as a regulated utility, was only able to do so because of the assurances it had 
been given by the state.  He explained how the company felt it deserved just compensation for 
agreeing to make early reductions in the CPA, being the first in the nation to comply with a 
mandatory cap. 
Bob Scott and Joanne Morin of the Air Resources Division then argued the position of 
DES.  Their allowance calculation of 4 million had stayed the same since it was initially 
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calculated a year earlier.
7
  They also directed our attention to new language in the draft 
amendment which would give DES the final say over the conversion and also establish a flow 
control mechanism to prevent the converted allowances from being used all at once.  The flow 
rate it proposed was 2.5 million allowances in 2009 and 2010 and 1.5 million in each year 
thereafter.  They argued that the total number of allowances given to PSNH was not as important 
as how much of an advantage the company would gain from their use in the beginning of the 
program. 
Jim Rubens of UCS and Melissa Hoffer of CLF argued on behalf of the environmental 
coalition, which was supportive of the DES position.  They first provided us with the relevant 
language in the CPA (emphasis added): 
 
For expenditures made by PSNH independent of SBC funds for energy efficiency, new 
renewable energy projects, or conservation and load management, the department shall 
provide emissions allowances to PSNH equivalent to the amount of such allowances that 
could have been purchased at market prices by the same dollar amount as the 
expenditure made (NH RSA 125-O:5, 2002). 
 
Noting the statute‘s use of the past tense, they argued that the DES was correct in using 
the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as a baseline because they were the 
only ones trading CO2 allowances at the time.
8
  They showed us how PSNH was instead using 
the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) as a baseline.
9
  They noted the discrepancy between 
allowances in the EU ETS and the voluntary reduction credits which traded on the CCX.  They 
said that even with flow control, PSNH would still have enough allowances to last them over 25 
years if their demands were met.  They predicted that PSNH‘s claim to these allowances would 
complicate the creation of a national cap and trade system as well. 
 Ms. Hoffer then proposed a solution to the subcommittee.  Rather than leave the decision 
up to DES, leaving the dispute open to litigation from PSNH, the conversion price could be set in 
statute, allowing us to find a reasonable middle ground or simply use the DES determination.  
                                                 
7
 PSNH was sent a preliminary determination by Director Scott in a letter dated April 16, 2007.  For the final 
determination, see http://des.nh.gov/organization/divisions/air/tsb/tps/aetp/documents/response_to_psnh_co2.pdf 
8
 The EUA average price for 2004-2006 was 15.33€/tonne.  EU ETS market data is available at 
http://new.evomarkets.com 
9
 The CFI price has historically remained at $3.95/ton.  CCX market data is available at 
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com 
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They warned that if we did not do this, a resulting lawsuit might delay the implementation of 
RGGI for years.  We then asked DES for their opinion but they declined, saying that it was a 
policy decision for us to make. 
 By the end of the last work session, on Tuesday, February 19
th
, the subcommittee had 
sided with the environmental community.  The members were locked in debate over whether to 
let DES and PSNH resolve the issue or to put the DES amount into statute using language 
proposed by Rep. Borden.  Rep. Fargo and Rep. Chase became agitated when members of the 
subcommittee appeared to be leaning towards the Borden amendment.  Most of the committee 
was not sure how they would vote until Rep. Kaen entered the room towards the end of the 
debate and simply stated her support of the Borden amendment.  This took Rep. Fargo by 
surprise; after the subcommittee voted in favor of the Borden amendment he concluded the work 
session with a look of disbelief. 
 
4.5  Executive Session 
 
 The final action on HB 1434 by STE was taken on Thursday, February 21
st
.  This resulted 
in the most substantial changes that would be made to the bill throughout the entire legislative 
process.  The committee amendment that was passed contained all the recommendations agreed 
upon by the subcommittee with the exception of the decision made two days beforehand. 
 The clerk of the committee, Rep. Chase, chaired the executive session because the chair 
and vice-chair had both recused themselves as sponsors of the bill.  He began by yielding to Rep. 
Kaen who once again took the committee by surprise with her remarks.  She apologized, saying 
that she‘d had a change of heart with her support of the Borden amendment.  She offered a 
metaphor, that ―Reggie‖ was trapped down inside of a mine shaft and that we were trying to 
rescue it.  She thought she could hear the way out and mistakenly led us down the wrong tunnel 
which turned out to be too narrow a pass for Reggie to fit through.  But now she assured us that 
she knew the only way to save Reggie was to return down the path which we all knew Reggie 
could fit through.  The metaphor implied that we should support a substitute amendment she had 
drafted the day before, in-lieu of the Borden amendment. 
 The committee was unsure what to make of this but decided it would be a good idea to 
consider the substitute amendment.  Rep. Kaen explained that this would leave DES to make the 
decision on early reduction allowances, but would sunset PSNH‘s collection of bonus allowances 
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after the second compliance period ends in 2014.  The committee then came to the conclusion 
that in practice much of this would not matter if a federal cap and trade program was instituted.  
She then proposed that we should adjust the flow control to allow the usage of 2.5 million early 
reduction allowances during each year of the first compliance period, and then 1.5 million during 
the second.  With the sunset in place this would theoretically limit PSNH to a total of 12 million 
allowances – considered to be a more than fair compromise between 4 and 41 million.  The 
committee ended up agreeing to this, seeing it as the most fair and practical solution. 
 I discovered afterwards from Rep. Fargo that in between the work and executive sessions 
he had talked with Rep. Kaen about what had happened.  He learned that she was worried about 
―giving away the farm‖ to PSNH and, like many members of the committee, was inclined to 
defer to the environmental interest groups.  He talked her into offering the substitute amendment 
for the reasons aforementioned, also reminding her that the Gittell study had predicted PSNH 
would see more negative costs associated with the program than its peers. 
 The final vote in favor of the bill as amended was 12 to 2.  Rep. Garrity joined Rep. 
Thomas in the minority, saying that the he thought RGGI was unnecessary in NH and that we 
were just creating another fund for the state government to raid. 
 
4.6  House Session 
 
 HB 1434 came up for a vote on the House floor on Wednesday, March 19
th
.  The floor 
debate was fairly insignificant.  The committee amendment was passed on a voice vote without 
any discussion. Rep. Thomas then gave a short speech in opposition and entertained questions 
from more representatives who were concerned about the economic impact that it could have on 
ratepayers.  Rep. Garrity also spoke against the bill but did not take questions.  Rep. Kaen then 
went up to the well only to answer questions, telling the body that instead of giving a speech she 
would refer us to the House Calendar where the committee‘s reasoning for and against were 
summarized well by Reps. Fargo and Thomas, respectively.  The majority report that was printed 
in the calendar is reproduced below (State of New Hampshire, 2008): 
This bill would formally enter New Hampshire in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
following a 10-state memorandum of understanding (MOU) to cap large fossil-fueled power-
generator carbon emissions at 2003 levels between 2009 and 2014, and to decrease CO2 
emissions by 10 % by 2019. The MOU, signed in December 2005 by the Governors of the ten 
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RGGI states, allocates to NH approximately 8.6 million out of a total of 188 million carbon 
emission allowances annually, giving NH a 4% stake in this regional program. A 2007 UNH 
study concludes that since NH participates in a regional power distribution system, NH ratepayers 
will pay for other states' participation even if New Hampshire chooses not to join. The UNH 
study further concludes that joining RGGI is in the best long-term economic interest of NH. The 
committee worked very hard to maximize the benefit to the citizens and businesses of NH, and to 
minimize the impacts to the ratepayers, while staying within the constraints of the MOU. HB 
1434 will create a dedicated Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Fund by selling, through a 
regional auction, NH's carbon emissions allowances. Proceeds from that auction will be directed 
primarily to consumer-level energy efficiency investments that will accomplish two main goals: 
1) to reduce energy demand, thereby reducing overall carbon emissions through conservation; 
and 2) to invest locally in energy efficiency business development.  HB 1434 recognizes past and 
on-going investments by PSNH to reduce carbon emissions as required by NH's Clean Power Act 
of 2002. HB 1434 includes several safeguards to protect NH's electricity consumers: 1) the 
Governor and Executive Council can suspend requirements of RGGI during an "emergency 
supply crisis"; 2) the NHDES is empowered to reserve 1% of the allowances to relieve suppliers 
during periods of high demand; 3) generators can opt to purchase qualified carbon offsets; 4) 
should the auction price exceed a safety threshold, fund proceeds above that threshold will be 
rebated to the ratepayers; and 5) HB 1434 includes provisions for routine reporting back to the 
General Court regarding program performance and any potential need for changes in NH's RGGI 
program. 
The minority report that was printed in the calendar is reproduced below (State of New 
Hampshire, 2008): 
The minority of the committee feels that the societal and environmental goals of RGGI are 
laudable (attempting a regional cap and reduction of carbon dioxide). But we disagree with the 
approach for the following reasons: 1) It saddles the electric ratepayer with short term rate 
increases; 2) It is unfair to electric ratepayers, because they will be subsidizing energy efficiency 
projects for non-electric users; 3) It creates a new ―greenhouse gas emissions reduction fund‖. 
This new fund could potentially hold between $16 million to over $100 million in its coffers. 
Although the funds are intended to be used for energy efficiency investments, there is no 
guarantee that a future legislature or governor will not raid that fund to balance budgets; in that 
case, our citizens will have borne the financial burden of the program without state department of 
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environmental services (DES) and public utilities commission (PUC) away from their primary 
New Hampshire mission to serve a multi-state, non-elected bureaucracy. 6) RGGI only addresses 
one sector of the carbon-producing economy (fossil-fuel based electric generating plants), but 
does not address the carbon dioxide from the transportation sector, residential heating sector or 
industrial sector. We feel this creates an unfair disadvantage to NH electric ratepayers (our 
neighbors and constituents). 7) New Hampshire‘s slowing economy cannot afford to be further 
hampered by increases in the costs of producing goods and services caused by government-
imposed mandates like RGGI.  Timing is not right for New Hampshire to join RGGI, and RGGI 
will not fix what ails Mother Earth. 
Rep. Kaen then requested a roll call vote, sufficiently seconded by a roughly a dozen legislators, 
and the question was called.  HB 1434 was then passed as amended with a vote of 214 in favor 
and 107 opposed. 
 
4.7  Senate 
 
 The bill was introduced in the Senate on March 27
th
, where it was first sent to the Energy, 
Environment and Economic Development Committee (EE&ED).  The bill was then sent to floor 
where it was referred to the Finance Committee before coming back to the floor.  The differences 
between the House and the Senate were settled without a committee of conference and the bill 
subsequently went to the Governor‘s desk where it was signed into law. 
 The Senators were not interested in making major changes and respected the work that 
STE had done to deal with the particulars of the bill.  Their only concern was the price for 
electric customers.  At the public hearing, the BIA and many of the larger business interests 
testified strongly in favor of lowering the price threshold.  This was then discussed in a meeting 
between the chair of EE&ED, Sen. Martha Fuller-Clark, Reps. Kaen and Fargo, Bob Scott, Mike 
Fitzgerald and Joanne Morin from DES, and Commissioners Below and Getz from PUC.  The 
two commissioners estimated that the SBC could handle up to $60 million in spending a year, 
which could be attained with a rebate set as low as $6.  Sen. Fuller-Clark then proposed an 
amendment which reset the threshold to $6 starting in 2009, increasing by $3 every two years 
thereafter before being phased out in 2016.  It also increased the revenue dedicated to low-
income assistance from 5% to 10%.  The committee adopted her amendment with a 4-1 vote and 
it was then passed on the floor 16-8 before being sent to Finance.   
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 The chair of Finance, Sen. Lou D‘Allesandro, did not see a good reason for HB 1434 to 
be sent to his committee.  He supported the bill already from what he knew of it, assuming that 
the price controls were right.  Upon hearing the bill in Finance he encountered more pressure 
from the BIA and ended up supporting their efforts to lower the price cap even further.  The 
majority of the Finance Committee did not support this and they instead adopted an amendment 
that slightly changed the price threshold by increasing it from $6 in 2009 to $8 in 2010. 
 Sen. D‘Allesandro opposed his committee‘s amendment on the Senate floor.  Eight others 
joined him but the amendment passed with fifteen voting in favor.  Three successive floor 
amendments were then introduced and defeated.  The first amendment proposed a threshold of 
$2 pegged to the CPI.  The second, from Sen. D‘Allesandro, proposed a threshold of $4 
increasing by $1 each year after.  The third was a non-germane amendment to the RPS statute.  
The Senate then voted to pass the bill as amended by the Finance committee with a vote of 16-8, 
including the entire Democratic caucus and two Republicans. 
 
4.8 Passage 
 
 The final step for the bill was to reconcile the changes made in the Senate.  After 
discussing the new $6 threshold with DES and PUC, Reps. Kaen and Fargo decided that they 
were happy with the finished product and a committee of conference would be unnecessary.  
Rep. Kaen then made a motion to concur with HB 1434 as amended by the Senate during the 
May 21
st
 House session.  The motion passed without debate and the bill was officially enrolled 
by the legislature. 
Gov. Lynch then signed HB 1434 into law on June 11, 2008.  The governor‘s public 
statement proclaimed urgency in addressing global warming and assured that the law would not 
hurt the state economically.
10
  The actual signing was followed by a well-attended signing 
ceremony in the executive chamber on June 16
th
.  Rep. Fargo remarked that the representatives 
of PSNH appeared wistful during the celebration.  One of them explained to him that the 
company was unsure about whether or not to be happy with how the bill turned out.  From the 
conversation Rep. Fargo gathered that PSNH had not fully absorbed what the program would 
mean for its future, even less so the eventuality of federal cap and trade. 
  
                                                 
10
 The Governor‘s entire press release is available at http://www.nh.gov/governor/news/2008/061108.html 
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5  Analysis 
 
5.1 Politics of HB 1434 
 
 The result of the legislative process was a bill that had been carefully deliberated and 
reshaped to better reflect the needs of New Hampshire.  That the policy was introduced and 
successfully enacted by the state legislature was important for the political success of the 
program.  Such a far-reaching policy decision would not have carried the same authority or 
public support had it instead been handed down through the executive branch.  Along with 
increasing the impact of the policy, this also made the policymaking process more accountable to 
the public and allowed a wider array of interests to weigh in.  Given that most of the essential 
provisions of the program were prescribed by the RGGI agreements, the legislature was able to 
devote more of its attention to the political balancing act surrounding HB 1434 in order to 
accomplish most important step – successfully passing it. 
 The most important thing to remember when viewing this result is that the legislative 
process is a means that justifies an end.  In order to understand who won and who lost in this 
battle, we need to identify what motivated the changes that were made to the legislation as it 
gradually came to resemble what was passed into law.  The first-person perspective of a 
legislator had limitations in this regard, despite its fundamental importance to this research.  It is 
unbecoming of a legislator to ascribe motives or question the intent of another.  Though based on 
observations taken at face value, the record of my experience with HB 1434, taken together with 
successive versions of the bill as it was amended, provides the information required to account 
for what resulted. 
With the exception of technical changes imposed by the Office of Legislative Services, 
the modification of HB 1434 represented political compromises, major and minor, that helped it 
towards receiving a supermajority of votes in both chambers of the legislature.  One of these 
decisions in particular was essential to bridging a momentary impasse, while others were more 
forward-looking, but all of them conferred gains and losses to one group over another and 
necessitated a reallocation of power.  While the legislature was the final arbiter of these 
decisions, the guiding hand of the DES is unmistakable in each of them.  It follows then that the 
bill‘s fate can best be described in that context. 
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As HB 1434 came directly out of RGGI, and the NEG/ECP by extension, the motivating 
force behind passing it was the executive branch.  After signing the MOU, Governor Lynch was 
compelled to start a cap and trade program in NH by the end of 2008, and every decision 
regarding HB 1434 ultimately rested on this expectation.  The governor‘s interest in passing HB 
1434 – intact – was transmitted through Democratic leadership in the House and Senate, which 
also had a partisan agenda listing greenhouse gas reduction as a top priority.  But one thing the 
governor and his executive department heads had which the legislature did not, was a 
prospective seat at the table for the development of a federal program.  It makes sense then that 
the bill was shepherded through by DES, whose career government employees were positioned 
on the frontier of the most important piece of environmental policy in history. 
This orientation towards the regional and national spheres shaped every major decision 
made by STE, whether or not the committee members shared it.  The issue of allowance 
allocation was presented to the committee as a question of whether to participate in a regional 
auction or hold a state one.  In reality they could have chosen ―neither‖ and provided for 
allowance distribution through some other mechanism or simply granted them to affected 
sources at no cost, as had been done in the EU ETS.  Interestingly, DES also included a 
provision for direct sale of allowances, alongside one for auctioning them, in the draft 
amendment they submitted to the committee.  When the question arose over what point there 
would be to selling allowances directly in addition to auctioning them, DES responded that there 
was none.  There was no consideration of direct sale before or after that, demonstrating the 
amount of control the department had over the discussion. 
The option to participate in a regional auction was similarly presented as the obvious one.  
The only thing committee members needed to hear was that other states were planning to 
participate in it, and their minds were made up.  The same held true in deciding how to use the 
auction revenues.  The 100% energy efficiency scenario was promoted not only by DES but also 
quite convincingly by the state-commissioned UNH Impact Study, which presented 
recommendations that were NH-specific.  The results of that study would have proven true in 
any state, but it was clear that this choice needed to be impressed upon the legislature in the 
event that it showed an independent streak.  The fact that most of the members of the committee 
initially opposed this option again speaks to the important role of DES. 
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Though there is room for debate over the nature of the department‘s involvement, it is 
clear that this was one portion of the bill that it felt strongly about.  Not only was it a politically 
dynamic area for the committee, but it was also the crucial point upon which some votes were 
cast.  The unambiguous direction that DES provided helped to build consensus early on around 
these issues and secure bipartisan support for the bill.  It happens that the main grievance of 
those who were steadfastly opposed to HB 1434 was not its acceptance of climate science, but 
that they saw it as ceding state authority to an outside body.  This had the effect of separating out 
the ideological opponents of RGGI, leaving those who might not have agreed with its intent to 
weigh the secondary benefits it could still bring to the state in the way of energy efficiency.  DES 
foresaw most of the problems that arose over these components of the legislation and did not 
leave anything up to chance, given their interest in upholding the standard that other states had 
set. 
The one debate in which DES did not have any apparent interest, yet still played a role in 
preempting difficulty, was over price controls.  The department included in its draft amendment 
the provision creating price thresholds accompanied by a consumer rebate.  The department had 
understandably been in agreement with the environmental community on much of the substance 
of the program, and generally did not opine on economic matters.  With the business lobby and 
the Office of the Consumer Advocate both in favor of price controls, however, this was destined 
to become a sticking point for HB 1434, with potential to threaten its passage.  While the House 
was somewhat less concerned with blunting the economic impact of cap and trade, it was viewed 
as a necessary safeguard against political backlash in Senate and became their only real point of 
difference with the House.  Arguably, the legislation was not significantly weakened by adding 
price controls. The final threshold price was arrived at based on realistic expectations of the 
state‘s capacity to provide energy efficiency benefits to consumers in the first year of the 
program.  The department originally set a threshold price that was double the optimal amount, 
knowing full well that the Senate would likely change it. 
Whereas the DES tried to remain above the fray during much of the deliberations, it was 
dragged into the dispute with PSNH in full view of the public.  This damaged its role as 
facilitator to the committee, but by that time most of the intended changes to the bill had already 
been finalized.  In this case the department claimed that they could not have undue influence on 
the committee‘s decision.  If the legislature chose to delegate the responsibility for allowance 
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conversion to DES this could have put them in a precarious legal situation.  STE struggled to 
interpret the CPA in the absence of firm direction from the department, but ultimately it rendered 
the matter ineffectual using the flow control mechanism.   
Though this dispute was resolved in the committee room, by no means did it develop 
there.  During the stakeholder process, CPA allowance calculation was clearly identified as a 
major obstacle that would have to be overcome.  Carefully worded letters were exchanged 
between PSNH and the department during that period, staking out their respective positions 
before the legislation was even drafted.  DES was either unwilling or unable to negotiate with 
PSNH in that environment. Understanding the legal ambiguity of the situation, the department 
deferred this decision for the legislature to rule on.  DES was able to reach its primary goal in 
this instance not in spite of the RGGI process but because of it. 
Thus, the most important lesson that can be learned from the story of HB 1434 is not one 
of DES‘s skill at playing the legislative game.  The multistate policymaking process did all the 
heavy lifting necessary to creating the first binding cap and trade program in the United States.  
The expertise required to get this large, complicated piece of policy through the legislature was 
not to be found among these volunteer legislators with limited resources.  The states instead 
assembled their most qualified technocrats to develop RGGI into a viable policy prescription.  
Their job also was to mete out solutions to wherever problems arose, extending beyond the pre-
legislative planning stages and into the political process.  In that, their central involvement in the 
program from the outset made them authoritative. 
Regardless of what one thinks of the Department‘s involvement, the bill should be judged 
by its outcome and not how it was created.  There has been substantial criticism of the power of 
technocratic elites to direct public policy but, as they apply to RGGI, such arguments merit a 
more in-depth discussion (Brint, 1990).  The professional power exercised by DES and others 
was legitimized by the legislature, which, if anything, would seem to suggest its own 
inadequacy.  The lack of resources and professional expertise in the New Hampshire General 
Court is an entirely separate issue and one which had a negligible impact in this case.  That the 
program was enacted should be seen as validation of the process that formed it; the bill was 
made to satisfy the public interest without straying from its purpose.   
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5.2 Economics of HB 1434 
 
 RGGI is evaluated in its current state, in the absence of any other GHG reduction 
policies, as to how it would be expected to perform over the period from 2009-2018.   
To determine impact of the program we have to look at the economic forces at work in the 
energy market and how it will influence them.  The primary benefit of this program is an 
absolute reduction in CO2 emissions from electric generation in NH.  The secondary benefits of 
the program in the way of energy efficiency create a positive feedback loop that increases its 
overall effectiveness.  Both components will be necessary in transforming the energy market to 
one that is less dependent on fossil fuels.  
The RGGI program reduces GHG emissions using the market-based, cap and trade 
mechanism.  It accomplishes this by mandating the desired environmental outcome and creating 
a market to allocate resources efficiently in meeting that mandate.  Cap and trade does not posit 
an increase in the price of electricity the way a direct tax would, but creates market conditions 
that practically ensure it.  The price of electricity responds to changes in electric demand and 
supply that develop as a result of the cap.  The market for allowances also responds to these 
changes, creating new competition within the generation market that did not exist previously. 
The important part of this program is the cap, which guarantees a set environmental 
outcome.  It creates a separation between the negative externality involved in the production of 
electricity from the amount consumed.  This change is critical for preventing climate change in 
the long term while maintaining a healthy economy in the short term, often seen as competing 
interests.  The cap essentially freezes generation from fossil fuels where it is now; future growth 
in installed capacity must come from renewable energy.  As the then cap tightens, coal-fired 
generation will likely be the first to go.  Generation from natural gas and renewables will become 
more favorable as a result but the cap by itself does not make a large-scale shift to alternative 
energy economically feasible.   
The trade component of the program turns CO2 emissions into a commodity, made scarce 
by the cap.  An allowance only gives a generator the right to emit 1,000 tons of CO2 and in 
theory has no monetary value in and of itself.  The auction and trading system then establishes a 
price for allowances relative to the demand for emissions among generators.  While purchasing 
allowances does not pose a significant cost at the outset, their appreciation over time makes them 
an asset to generators if they are not expended.  As financial instruments, these allowances give 
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generators more flexibility in the timing of investments to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels.  
This is particularly important for PSNH, which is one of the most carbon-intensive generators in 
the region, and explains why they fought as hard as they did to receive bonus allowances.  
Though the flow control limits their ability to expend them in the near term, PSNH‘s bank of 
allowances gives them a competitive advantage in the long term. 
 Allowance expenditures will not lead to a dramatic rise in electricity prices nor will they 
affect the amount of electricity demanded.  It can be assumed the additional cost of cap and trade 
will act similar to a carbon tax, causing a slight reduction in electric consumption.  Figure 5-1 
describes the effect of an externality tax on the retail electric market: 
 
Figure 5-1:  Supply and Demand of Electricity with an Externality Tax 
Demand for electricity is relatively inelastic compared to supply in the short term.  This stems 
from the fact that electric utilities are a regulated monopoly and provide a basic public service 
that consumers are largely dependent on.  The result is that consumers will bear the burden of the 
cost associated with emissions control almost entirely.  However, the projected price increases 
under RGGI will only amount to pennies on the dollar and will likely go unnoticed by retail 
customers.  Any change in consumption resulting from this will be negligible and will not 
contribute significantly to reduced emissions.  While the program is not likely to change 
consumer behavior using price signals, it will affect consumption in another way. 
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 The program converts the cost of allowances into a secondary benefit to consumers, 
which will also cause a shift in electric demand.  Rather than rebating the proceeds from 
auctioned allowances directly to customers, this money will be reinvested in the CORE Energy 
Efficiency programs.  Based on the historical performance of the programs it is estimated that 
they will save one kilowatt-hour for ever $0.33 spent.  At that rate — double the price of 1 kWh 
of electricity — the CORE programs can yield one dollar of electricity savings for every two 
dollars of cap and trade revenues.  As a function of program revenues, energy savings will keep 
pace with price increases that result from cap and trade, effectively cutting the retail cost of cap 
and trade in half.  Figure 5-2 compares the demand shift from energy efficiency to the change in 
demand that results from cap and trade alone: 
 
Figure 5-2:  Demand Shift from Energy Efficiency 
  
Based on projections, the program will slow the annual growth in electric demand by about 25% 
initially and by 50% in 2018.  This comes close to reaching the 10% maximum increase in 
energy efficiency that the PUC commissioners say can be realized through the CORE programs 
in the next ten years.  Though it could increase if energy efficiency measures become cheaper 
due to increased investment and advances in technology, the extent of these reductions relative to 
overall electric demand will be small.  Demand reduction will blunt the consumer impact of cap 
and trade to allow for continued economic growth, and will supplement the impact generators an 
extra year of flexibility in timing emissions reductions. 
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  To reach compliance with cap and trade New Hampshire must turn to renewable 
generation in meeting future demand.  Cap and trade is designed to reduce CO2 emissions 
primarily by forcing a technological change in electric generation.  While is true that New 
Hampshire‘s reliance on renewable generation will have to increase it is unclear is whether the 
cap will force fossil-fuel fired generation out of the market.  As stated, the deciding factor in the 
switch from coal to cleaner energy is the price of allowances.  If the cap had been set too low the 
allowance market would be short, causing allowance prices to trade exorbitantly high and 
denying the industry the flexibility it needs to function efficiently.  In worrying that such an 
outcome would consign the program to failure, the states instead set the RGGI cap too high.  
NH‘s gap between actual emissions and those allocated under the cap is 10% according to the 
EPA, but other organizations say it could be as high as 17% regionwide (Environment Northeast, 
2009).  Such a discrepancy means that a 10% reduction in the cap does not necessitate a 10% 
reduction in emissions. 
Overallocation has not prevented the RGGI market from functioning, but it does dilute 
the value of allowances.  Judging by auction results RGGI has seen success in its first year, and 
independent monitors are generally satisfied with activity on the secondary market.  No 
allowances put up for auction went unsold, so there is a sufficient demand for allowances.  The 
secondary market has seen regular trade volumes around 1 million a day and decreased volatility 
as the market matures (Potomac Economics, 2009).  The clearing price at the first auction in 
September 2008 was $3.07, rising to $3.38 in December and $3.51 in March 2009 before settling 
back down to $3.23 in June.
11
  The price of RGGI futures finally settled back down to around 
$3.00 and did not trade significantly higher than the auction price for much of the year.
12
  This is 
a bit higher than the expected price of $2.00 which was used to model the impact of RGGI but 
well below the threshold price of $6.00 a ton.  
 If allowance prices remain as they are now, the program encourages marginal emissions 
reductions but will not be putting coal generators out of business anytime soon. The PSNH plants 
emit roughly 1 ton of CO2 for every MWh produced, so the current cost of the program to them 
is $3.00/MWh.  Factoring that into a plant cost of $40 per MWh, this is less than a 10% increase 
in production costs for only a third of their total generation (United States Department of Energy, 
                                                 
11
 For updated auction results, see http://www.rggi.org/co2-auctions/results 
12
 For the current price of  RGGI futures, see http://www.ccfe.com/mktdata_ccfe/futuresSummary.jsf?symbol=rggi  
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2007).  This will have an impact on their generation choices, and together with changes in fuel 
prices will cause them to use their own coal plants less and purchase more electricity from 
hydroelectric and biomass plants on the market.  However, it will be difficult to shut down the 
coal plants entirely because PSNH has a public interest in operating them not present with other 
generators.   
Having a deregulated energy market is important for cap and trade to function properly.  
NH ratepayers receive an additional benefit from PSNH owning its own generation but it comes 
at an environmental cost that it cannot afford in the long run.  This exception is the result of an 
unresolved political issue that New Hampshire will eventually have to confront if a more 
stringent emissions reduction policy is adopted.  The movement of capital towards alternative 
energy can be directed most efficiently by the market and the risk associated with such long-term 
investment should be borne by the private sector.  The vast majority of New Hampshire served 
by PSNH is currently insulated from such changes by the large reserve of bonus allowance that 
the utility has, but this advantage will almost certainly not hold under a federal cap and trade 
program. 
 
5.3 National Policy Environment 
 
Despite its limited ability to stop climate change, RGGI has a greater impact on the 
country as a whole as it prepares to regulate CO2 emissions.  Seeing itself as the vanguard of 
environmental policy in America, NH‘s legislature was rallied by the historic nature of its work 
and valued a strong consensus over a strong cap and trade program.  This might make HB 1434 
seem like more of a symbolic victory, but getting the electric industry to agree to regulation on 
CO2 emissions presents an enormous challenge in stopping climate change.  Cap and trade 
enacted on the national level will have major implications for the regional program.  Whether or 
not this will be an improvement depends on the extent to which the federal government can build 
on the political success of RGGI. 
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5.3.1  National Cap and Trade 
 
The idea of national cap and trade is nothing new to the United States, but only recently 
has it become a political reality.  When the question was raised in 1997, over participation in 
international cap and trade under the Kyoto Protocol, the prevailing view was that it would result 
in serious harm to the American economy (EIA, 1998).  Opposition to Kyoto was so unanimous 
that President Clinton decided not to submit articles of the treaty to the Senate for ratification.  
Without legislative approval, the United States‘ signature of Kyoto was effectively meaningless.  
The decision to formally join Kyoto was then left up to the Bush administration, which chose to 
run out the clock until the 2005 deadline for ratification had passed. 
The rest of the world looks for the United States to take a step forward in order to 
negotiate a replacement for Kyoto in 2010.  The fear of economic damage resulting from an 
emissions cap is tied to past opposition from developing nations such as India and China.  
Preventing climate change will not be possible without the participation of these countries, and 
the United States does not want to move early to reduce emissions if it is not going to have a 
serious impact.  While the perception is that these countries, not the United States, are standing 
in the way of a broad international agreement, the reality is their citizens are much more 
supportive of one than we are.  According to a 2009 poll of public opinion across 19 countries 
comprising 60% of the world‘s population, Americans placed the lowest priority on their 
government addressing climate change (World Public Opinion, 2009).  Thus, the difficulty of 
enacting a national policy is at the heart of the United States‘ reluctance to commit to emissions 
reductions on the international stage.  Getting separate nations to agree all at once to reduce 
emissions may prove to be easier than actually reaching agreement within the United States 
beforehand.   
Taking decisive action to reduce CO2 emissions requires building a national consensus 
between geographically disparate regions of the United States.  The ―upwind‖ opponents of  NOx 
cap and trade in the 1990‘s have reemerged, albeit under a new name.  Fittingly referred to as 
―coal states,‖ they make up America‘s agricultural and manufacturing base and, as a result, have 
the most carbon-intensive electric generation.  The RGGI states, by contrast, are among the least 
coal-dependent, accounting for less than 4% of total coal-fired generation in the United States 
despite representing over 16% of its total population (EIA, 2008).  Including the three large 
Pacific states planning a regional cap and trade system similar to RGGI, the average reliance on 
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coal in the remaining 37 states is 10 times higher per-capita.  Such a discrepancy poses a political 
obstacle to national cap and trade that was not present with RGGI. 
The task of enacting nation-wide cap and trade program is complicated also by the 
difference between state and federal government.  As was the case in NH, executive branches 
had a dominant role in seeing RGGI through to the end and in some states they created the 
program without any legislative involvement.  The political and geographic unity of the states 
empowered technocratic elites, many of whom had already developed relationships working 
together on energy and environmental issues.  The central involvement of government regulators 
also encouraged greater cooperation from the electric industry.  A similar policy environment — 
one which allows cap and trade to be a relatively painless endeavor — does not exist at the 
federal level. 
The global implications of climate change demand action from the United States and the 
President is ultimately responsible for ensuring it.  The relevant federal agencies have a wealth of 
expertise with regulating power plant emissions, though it was not used effectively under the 
Bush administration, which opposed emissions controls.  Under President Obama, who strongly 
favors cap and trade, the EPA and the DOE are now in alignment behind the policy.  The 
president is also using his Economic Recovery Advisory Board to mobilize businesses in support 
of cap and trade (Doerr, 2009). But while the executive has unparalleled power in setting this 
new policy direction, his ability to follow through on it is checked by congressional prerogative. 
The economic implications of cap and trade demand that it have political efficacy that 
only Congress can provide.  The advice of government experts remains indispensable in the 
overall design of a program, but the biggest decisions concern its details, over which legislators 
will negotiate intensely on behalf of their constituents.  The opportunities for compromise in 
Congress are unlike anything cap and trade saw at the state level.  A strong, carefully-crafted 
piece of legislation can make it through the House of Representatives relatively unscathed due to 
effective party leadership.  But cap and trade faces an enormous institutional hurdle in the 
Senate, where coal state senators could potentially stop the entire process in its tracks.  Though 
portions of the policy may be sacrificed to make it through, cap and trade enacted at the federal 
level will undoubtedly have a greater impact than RGGI. 
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5.3.2  American Clean Energy and Security Act 
 
On June 26, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 219-212 to pass H.R. 2454, 
the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act.  At over 1,400 pages long, the 
bill promises an explosion of federal programs to combat climate change, making it the most 
comprehensive piece of legislation in history but a politically unwieldy one the same time.  The 
central component of the bill is national cap and trade, for which it has drawn fire from the fossil 
fuel industry and Republicans, who have given it the misnomer of ―cap and tax.‖  As a 
complement to cap and trade, the bill also contains initiatives resembling everything advocated 
for in New Hampshire‘s Clean Power Strategy back in 2001, and then some.  This speaks to the 
fact that this bill is essentially trying to make up for lost time; this area of policy has seen no 
progress on the federal level in almost a decade.
 13
 
With respect to the electric industry, H.R. 2454 creates incentives beyond cap and trade 
to accelerate emissions reductions.  It provides for research and investment in transmission 
planning, net metering, smart grid, carbon capture and sequestration, nuclear and other advanced 
technologies.  It also creates new building, lighting and appliance, industrial, residential, and low 
income community energy efficiency programs.  But if there is one secondary program in the bill 
that is indispensable, it is the federal Renewable Electricity Standard.  This replaces the 
patchwork of state renewable standards, creating a blanket policy for electric utilities across the 
nation that will guide the switch to renewable sources of electric generation.  A strong federal 
incentive structure such as this, coupled with public funding for research in clean energy, will 
make possible the transformation in the electric generation market needed to comply with 
emissions controls.  
The cap and trade program proposed in Waxman-Markey will replace RGGI with a more 
aggressive emissions target of 83% of 2005 levels in 2020, down to 17% by 2050.  It also builds 
on the quarterly auction design of RGGI, setting a reserve price of $10 in the first year that 
increases by 5% each year thereafter.  The program includes affected sources under RGGI while 
expanding to cover smaller industrial emitters over time.  The allowance conversion from 
regional to federal is based on the average auction price from the year that allowance originated.  
This gives RGGI generators at least a 3-to-1 advantage, assuming federal auctions produce 
allowance prices over $10, and the recent drop in RGGI allowance prices suggests they seek to 
                                                 
13
 The read the full text of H.R. 2454, see http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
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press this advantage further.  The RGGI states themselves welcome the stronger federal program, 
and expect that it will carry over funding for state energy efficiency programs (Bowles, 2009).   
RGGI states will inevitably have to make concessions to coal states if Waxman-Markey 
is to become law.  They can expect the conversion of RGGI allowances to be one such 
bargaining point.  RGGI allowance-holders already took a hit in the compromise that got the bill 
through the House.  In it, the majority of new allowances are no longer auctioned as planned, but 
initially given to generators for free as a consumer benefit.  While this prevents it from having a 
large economic impact initially, the program in H.R. 2454 is still an improvement over RGGI 
because it takes an economy-wide approach to increasing efficiency and promoting clean energy.  
However, in order for it to be effective in reaching the underlying goal of halting climate change, 
Congress must learn from our experience with RGGI and set the emissions cap carefully.  The 
Northeast states began cap and trade in the absence of leadership from Washington but now look 
to the federal government to pick up where they left off.  
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6  Conclusion 
 
 It first needs to be said that in the two years that I spent working with RGGI —  
participating in its creation and later observing as it took on a life of its own —  what surprised 
me most was the unquestioned dedication of our executive department employees to an issue that 
is so politically challenging.  With another two years of study, I still would not know enough 
about this integral sector of our economy, and how to go about changing it.  Also remarkable 
was that despite a proximity to political and corporate interests that would leave most people 
cynical, these officials pressed ahead in serving a public interest not nearly as salient.  In fact, the 
most frustrating thing about working with this issue is how difficult it is to grasp not only the 
solutions, but the problem itself and what it really means for our future.  When overwhelmed by 
the enormity of an issue like this, politicians become susceptible to uncertainty and doubt.  It was 
the confidence exuded by New Hampshire‘s career civil servants, who saw RGGI through from 
start to finish, that prevented this from ever occurring. 
 The decisions I had to make during our consideration of RGGI were all made with 
confidence.  The immediate question for some concerned the underlying premise of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, but for me the reality of global warming was a foregone conclusion 
and I only benefited from learning more of the climate science surrounding it.  With that out of 
the way, two major questions remained.  First I had to decide whether or not the proposed policy 
was the right one to achieve the desired outcome.  My own ideas about this going into the 
process were therein challenged, but my basic answer to this question did not change — it only 
became more nuanced.  I also had to decide if this particular piece of legislation maximized the 
effectiveness of the chosen policy while shielding the citizens of New Hampshire from 
unintended consequences. 
 Based on the political circumstances and the timeliness of addressing climate change, I 
decided that cap and trade was the correct policy for New Hampshire in 2008.  With a primary 
goal of reducing CO2 emissions, no policy provided more certainty over emission levels than this 
one.  In an environment where the public supported government action against global warming 
but had no conception of what it would cost, this policy used the power of markets to determine 
a price for CO2 emissions.  The implementation of this policy demanded more responsibility 
from the electric industry through a highly regulated system but required little involvement, if 
any, from the public.  At the same time, it made sure to balance the cost of emissions reductions 
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between producers and consumers by making positive use of the revenues through energy 
efficiency measures.  Lastly, the trade component of the policy provided greater flexibility to 
power producers by creating a long-term financial instrument that would help them in planning 
investments in cleaner technology. 
 Knowing that primary goal of reducing emissions would be secured in passing the cap 
and trade, I made my decisions on all secondary matters pertaining to the bill so as to ensure 
public confidence in it.  There was a certain amount of pride associated with creating a historic 
piece of environmental legislation, and I was among those who hoped New Hampshire‘s would 
be a shining example to others.  However, when put into proper historical context, our 
responsibility was not to ensure we had the best cap and trade program but to ensure it would not 
be the last.  On the less controversial matters of participating in the regional auction and 
instituting price controls, I was in agreement with the majority in my committee that these were 
beneficial to the state‘s citizens.  In the argument over conversion of CPA allowances, I initially 
believed that a large share of bonus allowances would tilt the equation too far in PSNH‘s favor.  
But when a compromise arose, promising to preserve the program‘s effectiveness, I saw it 
necessary to protect the interests of PSNH and the vast majority of ratepayers it serves.  In 
deciding these issues, I was confident that we had made HB 1434 appropriately sensitive to the 
economic needs of New Hampshire. 
 Passing cap and trade in New Hampshire did not solve the climate crisis, but it was a 
necessary step in what must be a continued evolution of public policy.  Whether this method will 
be the most effective way of reducing emissions remains to be seen, but whatever becomes of it, 
we must remember that RGGI was our earliest attempt at addressing this problem.  While the 
initial results suggest that the program has had a weak effect, new data suggests that emissions 
are set to grow significantly in 2010 after having been abnormally low in 2009 due to the 
recession (EIA, 2009).  It would seem then that the Northeast states were prescient in setting a 
cap that was not too tight, lest it go down in history as having prevented economic recovery.  
That judgment reflects the five-year consensus-building process responsible for making RGGI a 
resounding political success.  The prospect of national cap and trade could make this seem like 
merely an exercise in confidence-building, but there is no doubt that 2008 was the year when we 
began moving in the right direction, from which there will be no turning back.   
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Appendix A NH Electric Power Industry 
 
 
Energy Information Administration Data 
 
Electric Power Net Generation (megawatthours) by Primary Energy Source and Industry 
Sector, 1990, 1995, 2001, and 2006: 
 
Source: EIA, 2007 
 
 
 
Electric Power Delivered Fuel Prices and Quality for Coal, Petroleum, and Natural Gas, 1990, 
1995, 2001, and 2006: 
 
Source: EIA, 2007 
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Electric Power Industry Emissions Estimates, 1990, 1995, 2001, and 2006 (thousand tons): 
 
Source: EIA, 2007 
 
 
Retail Sales and Average Retail Prices by Sector, 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2006: 
 
Source: EIA, 2007 
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Data 
 
CO2 Emissions Factor by Fuel Type: 
 
Source: EPA, 1997 
 
 
CO2 Emissions (million metric tons) from Fossil Fuel Combustion in New Hampshire: 
 
Source: EPA, 2007 
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ISO-New England Data 
 
Summary of Annual and Peak Use of Electric Energy for New England and the States: 
 
Source: ISO-NE, 2007 
 
 
New England Annual Load Factor (i.e., the ratio of average hourly demand to hourly peak 
demand) (ISO-NE, 2007): 
 
Source: ISO-NE, 2007
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NH Public Utilities Commission Data 
 
Budget, Participation, and Lifetime kWh Savings Goals for 2008 New Hampshire CORE Energy Efficiency Programs: 
 
Source: PUC, 2007 
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Appendix B Analysis 
 
 
RGGI Model Inputs 
 
Model Assumptions: 
Year Electric Demand 
(kilowatt-hours) 
Electric Price 
(per kilowatt-hour) 
CO2 Emissions 
(tons) 
CO2 Price 
(per ton) 
2009 12,265,000,000 $0.154 8,620,460 $2.00 
2010 12,430,000,000 $0.155 8,620,460 $2.00 
2011 12,660,000,000 $0.155 8,620,460 $2.00 
2012 12,890,000,000 $0.155 8,620,460 $4.00 
2013 13,115,000,000 $0.155 8,620,460 $4.00 
2014 13,330,000,000 $0.155 8,620,460 $5.00 
2015 13,550,000,000 $0.155 8,404,948 $6.00 
2016 13,775,000,000 $0.155 8,189,436 $6.00 
2017 14,004,000,000 $0.155 7,973,924 $6.00 
2018 14,236,000,000 $0.155 7,758,412 $8.00 
Source: Gittell & Magnusson, 2008a 
 
RGGI Model Outputs 
 
Projected Annual Program Cost and Benefit to Consumers (millions): 
 
  
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
$60
$70
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Additional Cost
Additional Benefit
76 
 
Forced Reduction in Carbon Intensity of Generators from Emissions Cap and Projected 
Demand Increases: 
 
 
National Policy Environment 
 
Climate Change as a Public Priority (10 being the highest): 
Source: World Public Opinion, 2009 
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Appendix D Legislation 
 
 
NH General Court 
 
Final version of House Bill 1434 (State of New Hampshire 2008): 
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 
In the Year of Our Lord Two Thousand Eight 
AN ACT relative to the regional greenhouse gas initiative and authorizing a cap-and-trade program 
for controlling carbon dioxide emissions. 
Be it Enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court convened: 
182:1 Findings. 
I. New Hampshire signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 9 other states wherein each 
state agreed to propose legislation or seek regulatory approval to implement an electric power sector 
cap and trade program on CO2 emissions, known as the regional greenhouse gas initiative (RGGI). 
The MOU outlines the primary elements of RGGI including: 
(a) Establishing a total CO2 emissions allowance cap for the region as well as individual state 
allowance budgets; 
(b) Setting aside a minimum of 25 percent of the state’s allowances for consumer benefit and other 
strategic energy purposes; 
(c) The limited use of documented CO2 emission reductions outside the electric power sector to help 
with compliance and the expanded use of such reductions when certain price thresholds for 
allowances are exceeded; and 
(d) Cooperation with other states in implementing the RGGI program.  
II. RGGI is a modest first step in addressing greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the direction 
of the New England Governors/Eastern Canadian Premiers goals and provides leadership in 
promoting a federal or international plan. If a comparable federal CO2 cap and trade program 
becomes law, the general court should consider the need to continue participation in RGGI in 
accordance with the provisions of the RGGI MOU. 
III. According to a recent economic study by the University of New Hampshire, implementation of 
the regional greenhouse gas initiative is in the best economic interests of New Hampshire and 
investment in energy efficiency and conservation will help to reduce energy costs for New Hampshire 
citizens. 
IV. For these reasons, the general court supports the implementation of RGGI to achieve CO2 
emissions reductions through an electric power sector cap and trade program that encourages energy 
conservation and efficiency. 
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182:2 New Subdivision; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Amend RSA 125-O by inserting after 
section 18 the following new subdivision: 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
125-O:19 Statement of Purpose and Findings. The general court finds that global climate change is a 
significant environmental problem which could already be contributing to changes in New 
Hampshire average temperatures, frequency of extreme storm events, number of days with snow 
cover, timing of spring river flows, and date of spring blooms. Recent studies and scientific evidence 
indicate that global climate change is caused by a buildup of natural and manmade greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is a significant greenhouse gas that contributes to 
global climate change. Therefore, the purpose of this subdivision is to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions resulting from energy use in New Hampshire. 
125-O:20 Definitions. In this subdivision: 
I. “Affected CO2 source” means any source with one or more fossil fuel-fired electricity generating 
units having a nameplate rated capacity equal to or greater than 25 megawatts. 
II. “Budget allowances” means those RGGI allowances comprising the state annual budget for CO2 
emissions specified in RSA 125-O:21, II. 
III. “Commission” means the public utilities commission. 
IV. “Compliance period” means a 3 calendar year time period, unless extended one calendar year by 
a stage-2 trigger event. The first compliance period is from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2011, 
unless a stage-2 trigger event extends the first compliance period to December 31, 2012. Each 
subsequent sequential 3 calendar year period is a separate compliance period subject to a one-year 
extension if a stage-2 trigger event occurs during the compliance period. The compliance period shall 
never be longer than 4 calendar years. 
V. “Consumer price index” or “CPI” means the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics unadjusted consumer price index for all urban consumers for the United States. city 
average, for all items on the latest reference base, or if such index is no longer published, such other 
index as the department determines is appropriate. The CPI for any calendar year is the 12-month 
average of the CPI published by the United States Department of Labor, as of the close of the 12-
month period ending on August 31 of each calendar year. 
VI. “Department” means the department of environmental services. 
VII. “Early reduction allowances” means allowances provided to affected CO2 sources for eligible 
projects undertaken which have the effect of reducing emissions at the affected CO2 source by an 
absolute reduction of emissions during calendar years 2006, 2007, and 2008, from a baseline 
approved by the department, through emission rate improvements or permanently reducing 
utilization of one or more units at a source. 
VIII. “International trading programs” means international programs approved by the department 
such as the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and offset credits established under the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to be used to obtain equivalent RGGI offset allowances 
pursuant to RSA 125-O:22, II(b). 
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IX. “Market settling period” means the first 14 months of any compliance period. 
X. “Offset allowances” means allowances issued to projects determined to be eligible by the 
department undertaken outside of the electric power sector to reduce CO2 or CO2 equivalent 
emissions. 
XI. “PSNH” means Public Service Company of New Hampshire or any successor to the company’s 
public utility franchise. 
XII. “Regional greenhouse gas initiative” or “RGGI” or “RGGI program” means the program to 
implement the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between signatory states, dated December 20, 
2005, as amended on August 8, 2006 and April 20, 2007, and the corresponding model rule to 
establish a regional CO2 emissions budget and allowance trading program for emissions from fossil 
fuel-fired electricity generating units.  
XIII. “Regional organization” means a non-profit organization formed by the signatory states to 
RGGI to provide technical and administrative assistance for such things as: emissions and allowance 
tracking, offsets development and implementation, allowance market monitoring, and data 
collection. The organization shall have no regulatory or enforcement authority. 
XIV. “Retire” means submitting a RGGI allowance to the department for compliance or other 
purpose or retaining a RGGI allowance by the department such that the allowance may never be sold 
or otherwise used again. 
XV. “RGGI allowance” means a limited authorization to emit one ton of CO2 issued by the 
department or other RGGI signatory state in accordance with this subdivision or the RGGI program 
and shall include budget allowances, offset allowances, and early reduction allowances. 
XVI. “Stage-one trigger event” means a 12-month rolling average CO2 allowance price that is equal 
to or greater than $7 in 2005 dollars, such figure adjusted annually on January 1 of each calendar 
year according to the consumer price index, but only when such a rolling average price occurs in any 
12-month period beginning after the end of the market settling period. 
XVII. “Stage-2 trigger event” means a 12-month rolling average CO2 allowance price that is equal or 
greater than $10 in 2005 dollars, such figure adjusted annually on January 1 of each calendar year 
according to the consumer price index plus 2 percentage points, but only when such a rolling average 
price occurs in any 12-month period beginning after the end of the market settling period. 
125-O:21 Carbon Dioxide Emissions Budget Trading Program. 
I. The department shall establish and enforce a CO2 emissions budget trading program consistent 
with this subdivision that shall be in substantial accordance with the RGGI program. 
II. The program shall include a statewide annual budget allowance of 8,620,460 tons during the 
years 2009 through 2014. Beginning January 1, 2015 and ending December 31, 2018, the budget 
shall decline by 215,512 tons per year, resulting in a 10 percent total reduction from the initial 
budget, after which it shall remain unchanged until further legislative action. 
III. The department shall make available for sale at one or more auctions all of the budget 
allowances for a given year, except for those granted or reserved under RSA 125-O:22, VI, 125-O:24, 
and 125-O:25. The department may also make available for sale at one or more auctions a portion of 
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future year budget allowances. Such auctions may be conducted in coordination with other states. 
Revenues from the sale of allowances shall be deposited in the greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
fund established under RSA 125-O:23. 
IV. The department shall grant to affected CO2 sources early reduction allowances, at no cost, for 
projects eligible to receive such allowances. 
V. The department shall grant offset allowances to owners of eligible offset projects located in New 
Hampshire. 
VI. The department and the commission shall report on an annual basis to the air pollution advisory 
committee under RSA 125-J:11 and the legislative oversight committee on electric utility 
restructuring under RSA 374-F:5, on the status of the implementation of RGGI in New Hampshire, 
with emphasis on the prices and availability of RGGI allowances to affected CO2 sources and the 
trends in electric rates for New Hampshire businesses and ratepayers. The report shall include but 
not be limited to: 
(a) The number of allowances sold in the RGGI program and the type of entities purchasing 
allowances; 
(b) The number of unsold allowances in the RGGI program; 
(c) The available price data of allowances from the regional auction and secondary markets; 
(d) Market monitoring reports; 
(e) The CO2 emissions by affected source, state, and RGGI region; 
(f) The spending of revenues from auction allowances by each RGGI state; and  
(g) The allocation and spending of the greenhouse gas emissions reduction fund, including associated 
energy savings and emissions reductions. 
(h) The status of any proposed or adopted federal CO2 cap and trade program, the impact on New 
Hampshire’s RGGI program, and recommendations for any proposed legislation necessary to 
accommodate the federal program. 
VII. The department may establish and enforce the CO2 emissions budget trading program in 
cooperation and coordination with other states or countries that are participating in regional, 
national or international CO2 emissions trading programs with the same or similar purpose 
including: 
(a) Entering into any agreement or arrangement with the representatives of other states, including 
the formation of a for-profit or non-profit corporation, any form of association or any other form of 
organization, in this or another state; and  
(b) Participating in any such corporation, association, or organization, and in any activity in 
furtherance of the purposes of this subdivision, in any capacity including, but not limited to, as 
directors or officers. 
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VIII. Any actions taken under this subdivision by the department or the commission shall not 
constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity and shall not be deemed consent to suit outside of New 
Hampshire. 
125-O:22 Compliance; Permit Required.  
I. Each affected CO2 source shall obtain and retire a quantity of RGGI allowances equivalent to its 
CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel fired generation for each compliance period. 
II. An affected CO2 source may use offset allowances for up to 3.3 percent of its compliance 
obligation, except that in a given compliance period: 
(a) If a stage-one trigger event occurs, an affected CO2 source may use offset allowances for up to 5 
percent of its compliance obligation; and  
(b) If a stage-2 trigger event occurs, the compliance period shall be extended to 4 years and an 
affected CO2 source may use offset allowances for up to 10 percent of its compliance obligation, 
including offset allowances or credits permanently retired from eligible international trading 
programs, as approved by the department. 
III. Purchasers or acquirers of RGGI allowances may retain unused RGGI allowances without limit. 
Affected CO2 sources may use retained RGGI allowances in future compliance periods. 
IV. No person shall operate an affected CO2 source without a temporary or operating permit issued 
by the department in accordance with this chapter and RSA 125-C. An affected CO2 source that is in 
operation upon the effective date of this subdivision, shall submit a complete application for a permit 
modification to the department no later than January 1, 2009. Applications for permits shall be upon 
such forms, and shall include such information as the commissioner requires under rules adopted 
pursuant to RSA 541-A. The commissioner shall act upon a permit application within a reasonable 
period of time. 
V. In addition to the provisions set forth in RSA 125-O:7, an affected CO2 source that fails to obtain 
and retire sufficient RGGI allowances during a compliance period, in accordance with RSA 125-O:22, 
I, shall obtain and surrender 3 RGGI budget or early reduction allowances in the next compliance 
period for each RGGI allowance that the affected CO2 source was short in obtaining compliance. 
VI. Budget allowances shall be provided to affected CO2 sources as needed and upon request for CO2 
emissions in periods of operation during which an Operating Procedure 4 capacity deficiency alert is 
in force as established by the ISO New England Inc. The department shall reserve from auction for 
such emergency conditions a quantity of allowances equal to one percent of the annual budget 
allowances which shall be the maximum made available in a given year under this paragraph. The 
department shall directly sell these allowances to the affected CO2 sources at the last regional 
auction clearing price. Those allowances reserved but not sold in a given year as provided in this 
paragraph shall be auctioned the following calendar year. 
VII. Upon recommendation of the commission, the governor with consent of the executive council 
may declare an emergency supply crisis, and the governor and council may allow affected CO2 
sources to forgo strict compliance with paragraph I for a given compliance period and be given 
reprieve from any associated penalties, provided that those affected CO2 sources obtain and retire an 
additional number of allowances during the next compliance period equivalent to any shortfall in 
allowances that may have occurred for the compliance period during which the declared emergency 
was made.  
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VIII. A distribution company may recover the actual, prudent and reasonable costs of investments in 
carbon emissions reduction or capture technologies through its default service charge pursuant to 
RSA 369-B:3, IV(b)(1)(A), provided that the commission first determines that the investment is in 
the public interest. 
125-O:23 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Fund. 
I. There is hereby established a greenhouse gas emissions reduction fund. This nonlapsing, special 
fund shall be continually appropriated to the commission to be expended in accordance with this 
section. The state treasurer shall invest the moneys deposited therein, as provided by law. Income 
received on investments made by the state treasurer shall also be credited to the fund. All programs 
supported by these funds shall be subject to audit by the commission as deemed necessary. A portion 
of the fund moneys shall be used to pay for commission and department costs to administer this 
subdivision, including contributions for the state’s share of the costs of the RGGI regional 
organization. Any new employee positions to be paid for using fund moneys shall be approved by the 
fiscal committee of the general court pursuant to RSA 124:15. The commission shall transfer from 
the fund to the department such costs as may be budgeted and expended, or otherwise approved by 
the fiscal committee and the governor and council, for the department’s cost of administering this 
subdivision. 
II. Fund moneys shall be used to support energy efficiency, conservation, and demand response 
programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions generated within the state, which may include 
programs proposed and administered by private entities, as well as by the department, the 
commission, and other state and local governmental agencies. Such programs may include, but not 
be limited to, improving the electrical and thermal energy efficiency of New Hampshire’s residential 
housing and commercial building stock via weatherization, energy auditing, energy efficiency related 
work force training and development, revolving loan funds for efficiency related investment, related 
industrial process and control systems, integration of passive solar heating and ventilation systems, 
and efforts to increase adherence to energy related building and electrical codes. These funds shall 
not be transferred or used for any other purpose. 
III. At least 10 percent of the moneys shall be used to assist low-income residential customers, as 
defined by the commission and in a manner compatible with other low-income programs 
administered by the commission, to reduce total energy use including heating fuels and to foster the 
development and retrofitting of highly efficient and affordable housing. 
IV. Notwithstanding paragraphs I, II, and III, all amounts in excess of the threshold prices listed 
below for any allowance sale made prior to January 1, 2016 that are deposited in the fund shall be 
rebated to all electric ratepayers in the state on a per-kilowatt-hour basis, in a timely manner, to be 
determined by the commission. For the following years listed, the threshold price shall be: 
(a) 2009, $6/ton. 
(b) 2010, $8/ton. 
(c) 2011 and 2012, $9/ton. 
(d) 2013 and 2014, $12/ton. 
(e) 2015, $15/ton. 
(f) After 2015, no threshold price. 
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V. In the event that the commission finds that a significant amount of unencumbered dollars have 
accumulated in the greenhouse gas emissions reduction fund, and are not needed for program 
purposes, the commission shall refund such unencumbered dollars to ratepayers in a timely manner. 
VI. All penalties collected pursuant to this subdivision shall be deposited in the greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction fund. 
VII. In selecting programs to be funded under this section the commission shall consider, at a 
minimum, the extent to which the proposed program can be expected to: 
(a) Reduce greenhouse gas emissions from all fuels used to provide electricity, heating, and cooling in 
New Hampshire; 
(b) Be cost-effective; 
(c) Reduce New Hampshire’s peak electric load; 
(d) Promote market transformation, innovative technology and economic development, and energy 
cost savings; and 
(e) Otherwise be consistent with the public interest and the purposes of this subdivision. 
125-O:24 Conversion of Allowances. 
I. PSNH shall receive credit for allowances received prior to the inception of the RGGI program in 
the manner described in this section. 
II. PSNH shall submit all necessary documentation to the department by January 30, 2009 relative 
to compliance with RSA 125-O:3, III(d). 
III. PSNH shall submit all necessary documentation to the department within 90 days of the 
effective date of this paragraph relative to RSA 125-O:5, III. 
IV. As soon as practicable after the start of the program, the department shall determine the number 
of allowances previously allocated to PSNH under RSA 125-O:3, II or awarded to PSNH under RSA 
125-O:5, III, that remain in PSNH’s account of CO2 allowances held by the department as banked 
allowances, after the company has completed compliance with the emissions cap of RSA 125-O:3, 
III(d) for the 2007 and 2008 calendar years. 
V. At the distribution rate specified in paragraph VI, the department shall grant to PSNH budget 
allowances, at no cost, equivalent to the total of the banked allowances pursuant to paragraph IV 
minus the early reduction allowances granted to PSNH under RSA 125-O:21, IV. PSNH shall be 
obligated to apply for early reduction allowances for any eligible projects it has undertaken. 
VI. The department shall grant budget allowances pursuant to this section as expeditiously as 
possible, but in no event shall the amount of budget allowances granted pursuant to this section 
total more than 2.5 million allowances per year in years 2009, 2010, and 2011, and 1.5 million 
allowances in each year thereafter. For each budget allowance granted, one banked allowance shall 
be retired.  
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VII. In the event the state no longer participates in the RGGI program due to legislative action or 
the RGGI program becomes invalid or unenforceable as determined by the department and certified 
to the secretary of state, the department shall cease granting budget allowances pursuant to 
paragraphs V and VI. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, PSNH shall have no right 
or claim to receive any additional budget allowances under this section beyond those already granted 
to it up to that point in time when participation in the program has ceased or the program has 
become invalid or unenforceable. If this point in time occurs part way through a year, the number of 
budget allowances given to PSNH for that year shall be pro-rated based on the distribution rate in 
effect for that year, provided the total amount of allowances calculated pursuant to paragraph IV has 
not already been granted to PSNH. 
VIII. The department shall not grant budget allowances after December 31, 2014 pursuant to this 
section without legislative authorization to continue the granting of allowances. Notwithstanding the 
other provisions of this section, PSNH shall have no right or claim to receive any additional budget 
allowances under this section beyond those already granted by December 31, 2014, should the 
legislature not authorize continuation of the allowance granting. 
IX. No remaining banked allowances held by the department originating from the calculation 
performed under paragraph IV, shall be used for RGGI compliance purposes after the department 
ceases to grant budget allowances in accordance with paragraph VII or VIII. These remaining 
banked allowances shall not be used for compliance or exchanged for value in any existing or future 
federal program. When developing future state programs, the legislature may recognize the 
existence of these remaining banked allowances when determining the future compliance obligations 
of PSNH. 
125-O:25 Set Aside for Voluntary Purchase of Renewable Energy Certificates. 
I. The department shall reserve from auction, for retirement purposes, a quantity of budget 
allowances, not to exceed one percent of the annual budget, equivalent to the CO2 emissions 
reductions associated with renewable energy certificates recognized under RSA 362-F and purchased 
voluntarily by electricity customers and not resold. 
II. Budgeted allowances reserved under paragraph I not retired at the end of each year shall be 
auctioned the following calendar year. 
125-O:26 Auction of Budget Allowances. Any rules adopted by the department relative to auctions, 
pursuant to RSA 125-O:8, I(d), shall provide that they: 
I. Shall be conducted based on the schedule and frequency adopted by the department in 
consultation with other entities participating in the RGGI program; 
II. Shall include the sale of allowances for current and future years to promote transparency and 
price stability in a manner to be determined by the department in coordination with the regional 
organization;  
III. Shall include auction design elements that minimize allowance price volatility, guard against 
bidder collusion, and mitigate the potential for market manipulation; 
IV. Shall include provisions to address, and to the extent practicable minimize, the potential for 
allowance market price volatility during the initial control period of the RGGI program; 
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V. Shall include provisions to ensure the continued market availability of allowances to entities 
regulated under a greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading program, taking into account the 
outcomes of auctions and monitoring of the allowance market, which may include the adoption of a 
flexible process that allows for ongoing modification of auction design and procedures in response to 
allowance market conditions and allowance market monitoring data, provided that the process 
allows for public comment and input; and 
VI. May be open to all qualified participants, and all qualified participants may sell or otherwise 
agree to transfer any or all allowances to any eligible entity. 
125-O:27 Review of the New Hampshire RGGI Program. At the time of the 2012 comprehensive 
review by the signatory states as required in the MOU, the commission and the department shall 
concurrently review New Hampshire specific elements of the RGGI program, in particular 125-O:23, 
IV and 125-O:25, and include the results of such review in the agencies’ annual report under 
RSA 125-O:21, VI. 
125-O:28 Cost Recovery. If the owner of an affected CO2 source is a public utility pursuant to RSA 
362:2 that provides electric distribution service pursuant to RSA 374-F, the owner may recover 
through the utility’s default service charge all prudently incurred costs of complying with the 
requirements of this subdivision in a manner approved by the commission. In the event PSNH sells 
an affected CO2 source, any cost recovery associated with this chapter shall be governed by RSA 369-
B:3-a. 
182:3 Carbon Dioxide Cap. Amend RSA 125-O:3, III(d) to read as follows: 
(d) 5,425,866 tons annually applicable to total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the affected 
sources until December 31, [2010, and after December 31, 2010, a lower cap to be recommended by 
the department no later than March 31, 2004, with timely consideration by the legislature expected 
by July 1, 2005] 2008. 
182:4 Emissions Trade and Banking. Amend RSA 125-O:6, I to read as follows: 
I. Develop a trading and banking program to provide appropriate compliance flexibility in meeting 
the emission caps established under RSA 125-O:3, III and allowance requirements of RSA 125-O:21 
and RSA 125-O:22, and to encourage earlier and greater emissions reductions and the development 
of new emission control technologies in order to maximize the cost-effectiveness with which the 
environmental benefits of this chapter are achieved. 
182:5 Rulemaking Authority. Amend RSA 125-O:8 to read as follows: 
125-O:8 Rulemaking Authority. 
I. The commissioner shall adopt rules under RSA 541-A, commencing no later than 180 days after 
the effective date of this section, relative to:  
[I.] (a) The establishment of trading and banking programs as authorized by RSA 125-O:6, I.  
[II.] (b) The establishment of a method for allocating allowances and other emissions reduction units 
or mechanisms as authorized by RSA 125-O:3, II and III.  
86 
 
[III.] (c) Emissions and allowance monitoring, tracking, recordkeeping, reporting, and other such 
actions as may be necessary to verify compliance with this chapter. 
(d) The method and requirements for auctioning budget allowances under RSA 125-O:21, which may 
use regional organizations.  
(e) Defining eligible projects for early reduction allowances under RSA 125-O:21, IV, and 
establishing criteria to quantify and grant such allowances. 
(f) Defining eligible projects for offset allowances under RSA 125-O:21, V, and establishing criteria to 
quantify and grant such allowances, including the accreditation of third-party verifiers. 
(g) The forms and information required on applications for a temporary or operating permit required 
under RSA 125-O:22. 
II. The public utilities commission shall adopt rules, under RSA 541-A, to administer the greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction fund pursuant to RSA 125-O:23. 
182:6 Compliance Dates Amend RSA 125-O:9 to read as follows: 
125-O:9 Compliance Dates. The owner or operator of each affected source shall comply with the 
provisions of this chapter, excluding the subdivision on mercury emissions, RSA 125-O:11 through 
125-O:18, and the subdivision for CO2 emissions, RSA 125-O:19 through RSA 125-O:28, by December 
31, 2006. 
182:7 Non-Severability. Amend RSA 125-O:10 to read as follows: 
125-O:10 Non-Severability. No provision of RSA 125-O:1 through RSA 125-O:18 of this chapter shall 
be implemented in a manner inconsistent with the integrated, multi-pollutant strategy or RSA 125-
O:1 through RSA 125-O:18 of this chapter [in its entirety], and to this end, the provisions of RSA 
125-O:1 through RSA 125-O:18 of this chapter are not severable. 
182:8 New Subparagraph; Application of Receipts; State Treasurer. Amend RSA 6:12, I(b) by 
inserting after subparagraph (268) the following new subparagraph: 
(269) Moneys deposited in the greenhouse gas emissions reduction fund established in RSA 125-
O:23. 
182:9 New Section; Energy Conservation and Efficiency Board. Amend RSA 125-O by inserting after 
section 5 the following new section: 
125-O:5-a Energy Conservation and Efficiency Board.  
I. An energy conservation and efficiency board is hereby created to seek opportunities to coordinate 
energy efficiency and demand response programs in the state. The board’s duties shall include but 
not be limited to: 
(a) Review available energy efficiency and conservation programs and incentives and compile a 
report of available efficiency and conservation resources in New Hampshire. 
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(b) Develop a plan to achieve the state’s energy efficiency potential for all fuels, including setting 
goals and targets for energy efficiency that are meaningful and achievable. 
(c) Provide written advice at least annually to the public utilities commission on the administration 
and allocation of energy efficiency funds under the commission’s jurisdiction. 
(d) Explore opportunities to coordinate programs targeted at saving more than one fuel resource, 
including coordination between the natural gas and other programs or projects which seek to reduce 
the use of other fuels. 
(e) Develop tools to enhance outreach and education programs to increase knowledge about energy 
efficiency among New Hampshire residents and businesses. 
(f) Expand upon the state government’s efficiency programs to ensure that the state is providing 
leadership on energy efficiency, reducing its use of energy, and reducing the state’s fuel costs. 
(g) Encourage municipalities to increase investments in energy efficiency through financing tools, 
and to create municipal energy committees. 
(h) Work with community action agencies and the office of energy and planning to explore ways to 
ensure that all customers participating in programs for low-income customers and the Low Income 
Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) have access to energy efficiency improvements in order 
to reduce their energy bills. 
(i) Investigate potential sources of funding for energy efficiency and delivery mechanisms for such 
programs, coordinate efforts between funding sources to reduce duplication and enhance 
collaboration, and review investment strategies to increase access to energy efficiency. 
II. The members of the board shall be as follows: 
(a) The chairman of the public utilities commission, or designee. 
(b) The director of the office of energy and planning, or designee. 
(c) The consumer advocate, or designee. 
(d) The commissioner of the department of environmental services, or designee. 
(e) The commissioner of the department of resources and economic development, or designee. 
(f) The president of the Business and Industry Association of New Hampshire, or designee. 
(g) The executive director of the New Hampshire Municipal Association, or designee. 
(h) A representative of energy services companies delivering energy efficiency services to residential 
and business customers, appointed by the chairman of the public utilities commission. 
(i) The executive director of New Hampshire Legal Assistance, or designee. 
(j) The president of the Homebuilders and Remodelers Association of New Hampshire, or designee. 
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(k) Two members of the house science, technology and energy committee appointed by the speaker of 
the house of representatives.  
(l) One member of the senate energy, environment and economic development committee, appointed 
by the president of the senate. 
(m) Three representatives from groups representing energy, environmental, consumer, and public 
health issues and knowledgeable in energy conservation policies and programs, appointed by the 
chairman of the public utilities commission. 
(n) One representative from the investment community with expertise in efficiency investments and 
financing, appointed by the chairman of the public utilities commission. 
(o) One representative from each of the utility-administered electric and natural energy efficiency 
programs, appointed by the chairman of the public utilities commission. 
(p) The executive director of the New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority, or designee. 
(q) The state fire marshal, or designee. 
III. The chairman of the public utilities commission shall call the first meeting of the board. The 
board shall elect a chairperson from among its members. The board shall make an annual report on 
December 1 to the governor, the speaker of the house of representatives, the president of the senate, 
the house science, technology and energy committee, the senate energy, environment, and economic 
development committee, and the public utilities commission, to provide an update on its activities 
and recommendations for action. 
IV. No member of the board shall vote on a matter in which the member, or the organization or 
entity represented by or employing the member, has a direct financial interest. 
182:10 Repeal. RSA 125-O:5, III, relative to emissions allowances to PSNH for energy efficiency, new 
renewable energy projects, or conservation and load management projects, is repealed. 
182:11 Contingency. If HB 1561 of the 2008 legislative session becomes law, section 9 of this act shall 
not take effect. If HB 1561 does not become law, section 9 of this act shall take effect October 1, 2008. 
182:12 Effective Date. 
I. Section 9 of this act shall take effect as provided in section 11 of this act. 
II. The remainder of this act shall take effect upon its passage. 
Approved: June 11, 2008 
Effective Date: I. Section 9 shall take effect as provided in section 11. 
II. Remainder shall take effect June 11, 2008. 
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